At least 3tn forints in Hungarian state assets were transferred to public-interest trusts under Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz government, creating a vast financial network that benefited party-linked businesses and figures, according to a report by 444.hu.
The trusts, known in Hungary as “kekvas”, were formally established to perform public functions while managing assets placed beyond the ordinary reach of the state. In practice, the investigation describes them as channels through which billions of forints flowed to companies and institutions connected to Fidesz and the political-business network surrounding Mr Orbán.
State assets moved into a protected network
The scale of the transfers was highlighted by Hungary’s state audit authority, which said public property worth no less than 3tn forints had been handed to the foundations. The sum covers assets transferred to the trusts during the years of Fidesz rule and represents one of the most significant reallocations of public wealth described in the report.
The arrangement gave the foundations control over substantial resources while allowing the government to present them as independent bodies serving educational, cultural, environmental or other public purposes. The 444.hu report argues that this structure helped create a parallel system of influence and finance, in which decisions over contracts, remuneration and institutional support repeatedly favoured people and companies close to the governing party.
Among the examples cited is the Kék Bolygó foundation, established by János Áder, Hungary’s former president. It signed large contracts with suppliers close to the Fidesz-linked NER network, including organisations involved in Planet Budapest and communications and information-technology providers. The report also identifies structures connected to István Tiborcz, Mr Orbán’s son-in-law, among those linked to the foundation’s network of contractors.
Contracts and payments to Fidesz-linked interests
The Alajos Hauszmann Foundation is described as having paid substantial remuneration to members of its board of trustees. It also entered agreements with legal and consultancy firms that had previously worked for state institutions. The pattern, according to the report, illustrates how public-interest foundations could direct money towards established circles with close links to government.
The Batthyány Lajos Foundation, meanwhile, financed pro-government institutes and cultural projects while awarding contracts to companies with connections to Fidesz. A separate foundation dedicated to preserving central European architectural heritage received injections worth billions of forints and paid significant fees to its leadership.
These cases do not represent isolated payments, the report says. Taken together, they show how the trusts became part of a broader system built during Mr Orbán’s years in power. Public assets were placed under the control of foundations, and the resulting funds were then used through contracts, institutional financing and senior remuneration in ways that strengthened the governing party’s allies.
A system built around political loyalty
Fidesz has long promoted an image of exceptional competence and effectiveness in managing Hungary. The continuing revelations about the trusts present a sharply different picture: behind the government’s claims of professional stewardship was a determined effort to accumulate wealth and redirect financial flows towards a narrow group of people close to Mr Orbán.
The principal beneficiaries identified in the material are business figures and officials associated with the NER, including oligarchs close to the former prime minister and Mr Tiborcz. Their rise is presented not as the result of an open contest for public contracts and opportunities, but as the product of a political hierarchy in which loyalty to the ruling circle brought access to state resources.
The system was also sustained by pressure on independent media and opposition forces. Restrictions on free and independent journalism limited the ability of the public to learn how the trusts operated and how money was distributed. Opposition parties were similarly constrained in their efforts to bring the information into wider public debate.
The central unresolved issue is whether the transfer of state wealth into these foundations can be reversed, or whether the network created under Fidesz will continue to shield its beneficiaries even as scrutiny intensifies.
Should Hungary prioritise recovering the transferred assets or tightening oversight of the trusts while leaving their existing structure in place?
