A Russian influence operation has circulated more than 180 fabricated social-media posts ahead of key German regional and local elections, attacking mainstream candidates while leaving two Kremlin-friendly parties untouched.
The campaign, known as “Matryoshka” or “Overload”, spread fake allegations of corruption, drug use, murder and sexual scandals on X, Bluesky and TikTok, according to Deutsche Welle. Its targets included representatives of all major political forces except the right-extremist Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the left-populist Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW).
The operation is aimed at influencing voters before a series of important ballots in September 2026. Elections to the Saxony-Anhalt state parliament will take place on 6 September, local elections in Lower Saxony on 13 September, and elections to the parliaments of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Berlin on 20 September.
A campaign built on fabricated scandals
The posts have promoted pro-Russian, anti-German and anti-European narratives, while also seeking to deepen tensions between Germany’s eastern and western regions. The material has presented invented accusations against political candidates as fact, using the kind of sensational claims designed to undermine trust rather than persuade voters through policy debate.
Experts currently assess the campaign’s effectiveness as limited. Some posts have attracted more than 100,000 views, but generated few natural interactions or comments, suggesting that their reach has been artificially inflated. That does not remove the broader risk: flooding the information environment with fabricated material can make citizens less willing to trust official sources and legitimate news organisations.
According to open-source intelligence researchers, Matryoshka is linked to the disinformation group Storm-1516, which is under the control of Russia’s military intelligence service, the GRU. The operation uses bot farms, fake accounts and fabricated versions of reports from respected media outlets to circulate pro-Kremlin narratives.
Why the eastern states matter
The timing is significant because the AfD is recording strong support in eastern Germany and leads polling in Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. The party may achieve high results, but its entry into state governments remains constrained by the refusal of traditional political forces to form coalitions with it.
Regional and local elections are nevertheless an important test of public sentiment before Germany’s next federal elections, as well as of attitudes towards the current federal government. Strengthening the AfD and BSW would give Russia more opportunities to influence political decisions in Germany and shape public debate about support for Ukraine, sanctions and the possibility of restoring dialogue with Moscow.
The two parties have repeatedly expressed positions that coincide with key Kremlin narratives on Russia’s war against Ukraine, sanctions policy and relations with Moscow. The fact that the disinformation wave avoided them indicates that Matryoshka is not indiscriminate: it is designed to damage opponents while helping forces whose positions are more favourable to Russian interests.
Part of a wider pressure campaign
Russia is using information operations more actively to influence democratic processes in Germany, treating the EU’s largest economy as a central target in its hybrid war against Europe. Berlin is one of Ukraine’s most important political, economic and military partners, making its internal stability directly relevant to the strength of Europe’s response to Russia.
The deliberate widening of the divide between eastern and western Germany is among the most serious elements of the campaign. Russian messaging exploits existing social and economic differences, as well as the particular historical experiences of people in the former East Germany, in an effort to turn those divisions into a lasting political conflict. A more polarised country would find it harder to develop a coherent national policy.
Matryoshka also forms part of a broader pattern in which Russia combines election-related manipulation with cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure, espionage and sabotage in EU countries. Even where individual campaigns achieve limited immediate impact, the cumulative pressure is intended to create a sense of permanent instability and divert European governments from supporting Ukraine.
The immediate question for Germany is whether the limited visible engagement with the fake posts will remain the main measure of their success. Their longer-term effect may instead be seen in declining confidence in political institutions, news sources and the ability of democratic systems to distinguish genuine disagreement from organised foreign manipulation.
How should German parties and social-media platforms respond when a foreign operation attacks some political forces while leaving others untouched?
