Germany’s Alternative for Germany party is proposing a foreign-policy reversal that would stop military support for Ukraine, lift economic sanctions on Russia and revive the Nord Stream project. The programme would also bring the AfD closer to Donald Trump’s administration while welcoming a smaller American military presence in Germany.
Two position papers presented on 2 November 2026 set out a course that would alter more than Berlin’s relationship with Kyiv and Moscow. If adopted by a future government, the proposals could weaken Europe’s collective pressure on Russia and place the terms of any settlement on a markedly different footing.
The papers were presented by Markus Frohnmaier, Steffen Kotre and Gerold Otten, the AfD politicians responsible for the party’s foreign-policy direction. Their contents were reported by Welt. They remain party proposals, not the terms of an existing peace agreement or government policy.
A peace framework without a direct condemnation
The shift is clearest in the language used to describe the war. The papers do not directly condemn Russia’s invasion. Instead, they describe the conflict as a “tragedy” that should end “as quickly as possible” through a decision taking account of the “security interests of all parties to the conflict”.
That wording does not amount to a detailed peace plan. It does not specify the conditions for a Russian withdrawal, the guarantees required for Ukraine’s security or the status of occupied territory. Nor does it explain how Ukraine’s interests would be weighed against Moscow’s demands.
It does, however, change the starting point for negotiations. Responsibility for the invasion recedes, while the urgency of a settlement and the interests attributed to both sides move to the foreground. If this approach became government policy, Kyiv could face greater pressure to accept an agreement before the questions of territory, defence and enforcement had been resolved.
The AfD presents a rapid settlement as a way to end the war. Whether it would produce peace would depend on terms that the reported proposals do not set out. Ending support for Ukraine without securing a withdrawal or enforceable guarantees would nevertheless change the balance in which negotiations took place.
Three demands that reduce Germany’s leverage
The most immediate demand is an end to military assistance for Kyiv. The party also wants the economic sanctions imposed on Russia to be lifted. One measure would reduce the resources available to Ukraine; the other would lower the economic costs facing Moscow since the invasion.
Taken separately, the proposals concern military and economic policy. Together, they would remove two of Germany’s principal means of influencing the course of the war. Ukraine would have less German support for its defence, while Russia would face less coordinated pressure to change its conduct.
The papers do not explicitly call for the legal recognition of Russian control over occupied Ukrainian territory. That conclusion cannot therefore be drawn directly from the demands. The concern lies in the likely negotiating environment created by them: if Russia retained occupied areas while Ukraine lost external support, the existing line of control could become the practical basis for a future agreement.
Such an outcome would not necessarily amount to formal recognition. It could nonetheless make territorial seizure easier to accommodate within a wider return to political and economic normality. It might also encourage Moscow to hold its position in the expectation that divisions among Ukraine’s supporters would improve its bargaining power.
The central uncertainty is whether the AfD’s proposed sequence would bring Russia to a settlement or simply transfer the pressure of ending the war from Moscow to Kyiv. The documents offer a political direction, not evidence that Russia would accept an agreement protecting Ukraine’s sovereignty.
Nord Stream and the return of an old assumption
The call to revive Nord Stream gives the programme an energy dimension. The project stands for the earlier German model of close commercial and gas ties with Russia, built on the assumption that economic interdependence could coexist with strategic disagreement.
Restoring Nord Stream while lifting sanctions would signal that Berlin could rebuild relations with Moscow before the war had been definitively resolved. It would therefore be more than an infrastructure decision. It would suggest that the separation between trade and security policy, largely abandoned after the invasion, could be restored.
For Ukraine, the significance would be political as well as economic. A return to direct energy cooperation could reduce the force of the pressure Europe has sought to maintain on Russia. It could also make the continued occupation of Ukrainian territory easier to accommodate within a broader return to normal relations.
Germany’s position matters beyond its bilateral ties. Berlin is one of Ukraine’s most important European supporters. A decision to end military aid and abandon sanctions would not automatically compel other EU governments to follow, but it would make a common policy towards Moscow harder to sustain.
Closer to Trump, less American protection
The AfD’s approach to the United States is selective rather than simply pro-American or anti-American. The papers call for closer cooperation with Donald Trump’s administration, welcome a possible reduction in the number of US troops stationed in Germany and oppose the deployment of American missiles there.
Those positions are not inherently incompatible. A party can seek political alignment with a US administration while arguing that Europe should carry more responsibility for its own defence. But alongside the proposed end to aid for Ukraine and the normalisation of relations with Russia, they point towards a looser German attachment to the existing transatlantic security framework.
Many European governments regard the American military presence and allied deterrence as important safeguards against further Russian expansion. A reduction in US forces would therefore raise a question the AfD papers do not answer: how would Germany and its European partners replace the capabilities and reassurance provided by Washington?
The documents also criticise what they call “woke ideology” in international organisations. By placing that cultural dispute alongside questions of alliances, missile deployments and the war in Ukraine, the AfD links a strategic realignment with a broader rejection of the political and social priorities associated with liberal international institutions.
From opposition platform to European test
For now, the proposals remain an opposition platform. Their significance lies in the direction they establish. The AfD is not simply arguing over the scale of German aid to Ukraine; it is challenging the premise that continued support for Kyiv and sustained pressure on Moscow should remain central German interests.
Implemented together, the measures would move Germany from being one of Ukraine’s principal supporters towards becoming a force for reducing sanctions, limiting military assistance and reopening economic channels with Russia. That could weaken the EU’s common position and increase the risk that an unresolved occupation becomes embedded in a future settlement.
Whether the AfD can move its programme beyond party politics remains open. The more immediate question is whether its proposed trade-off — faster negotiations and renewed economic ties in exchange for less support and pressure — will reshape Germany’s wider debate about the war and Europe’s security.
