The European Union is preparing tougher visa rules for Russian citizens as Poland, Sweden and Estonia warn that the Schengen travel system may leave openings for hostile operations. But the European Commission is not expected to present its formal proposal until January 2027, setting up a dispute over whether Europe is moving quickly enough.
The measures under discussion could affect a substantial flow of travellers. EU countries issued about 478,000 tourist Schengen visas to Russian citizens in 2025, many of them allowing multiple entries. That figure does not show that visa holders have committed wrongdoing. It does, however, illustrate the reach of any common decision to restrict access.
The argument is centred on a practical problem: Schengen has shared external borders but largely national visa decisions. Governments seeking tighter controls say that uneven rules can weaken the entire area, while a proposal to exclude former Russian military personnel would raise difficult questions about evidence, proportionality and implementation.
A common travel area, divided decisions
Poland, Sweden and Estonia are pressing for fewer visas to be issued to Russian nationals and for a more consistent approach across the EU. In June, nine EU countries, together with Iceland and Norway, called for a common policy on Russian visa applications.
The concern is that a person refused by one country may, in some circumstances, apply through another. A visa issued by one Schengen state can generally permit travel across much of the border-free area, meaning that national choices have consequences beyond the consulate that makes them. Supporters of a common policy therefore argue that stricter action by only a handful of countries can be bypassed or diluted.
Swedish Justice Minister Gunnar Strommer has described the current visa system as a security concern against a backdrop of suspicions about sabotage, arson and other forms of hybrid activity linked by several European governments to Russian state structures. Those are official security assessments and suspicions about possible operations; they do not establish that ordinary Russian travellers are involved in criminal acts.
EU Migration Commissioner Magnus Brunner has also urged member states to issue fewer visas to Russian citizens. “You never know who these tourists really are,” he said, presenting stricter scrutiny as a way to reduce uncertainty about applicants. The remark is not evidence that every Russian applicant poses a security threat.
The debate was reported by Politico, which described the proposed restrictions as part of wider efforts to prevent hybrid attacks.
Estonia wants former military personnel excluded
Estonia has put forward the broadest measure now being discussed: barring former members of the Russian armed forces from entering the EU. Tallinn estimates that the category includes about 650,000 people.
Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna has said that Russian security services could potentially use some former military personnel for terrorist attacks, sabotage, violence or influence operations. That is the Estonian government’s assessment of a possible risk, not a finding that the group as a whole is dangerous or connected to Russian authorities.
A blanket exclusion would immediately create practical and legal problems. Authorities would need to establish how previous military service could be verified, how long a ban would last and whether exemptions should apply. They would also have to distinguish between an individual risk supported by relevant information and a military background with no established link to hostile activity.
The proposal would depend on more than new visa forms. It would require reliable information-sharing between consulates, security agencies and border authorities. Someone admitted through one external Schengen border can, in principle, continue into other participating countries without routine checks at internal borders. Supporters of the Estonian position therefore want stronger screening, closer intelligence cooperation and better coordination at the EU’s external frontier.
That exposes the central trade-off. A category-based ban would be easier to administer than a fully individual process, but it could include people for whom no security concern has been established. Individual screening could be more precise, yet it would require shared criteria, usable data and consistent procedures across member states.
The price of waiting until January
The proposed timetable has become part of the political dispute. Governments that view hybrid threats as an immediate danger argue that waiting until January 2027 could weaken the preventive effect of any future restrictions. If officials already believe that hostile networks may exploit weaknesses in the travel system, they say, a proposal several months away leaves the existing framework in place during the intervening period.
The Commission’s eventual choice will not be limited to a simple decision about whether to issue more or fewer visas. It could tighten procedures for all Russian applicants, restrict particular categories of travellers or place greater emphasis on individual indicators of risk. Each option would have different consequences for consulates, border officials and people seeking to travel to Europe.
A nationality-based restriction might be straightforward to apply, but it would treat citizenship as a significant security proxy. A ban based on former military service would be narrower in one sense, yet still cover a very large and diverse group. A targeted system would better reflect individual circumstances, but only if European authorities can obtain reliable information and apply the same standards in every participating country.
Effectiveness will also depend on whether governments act together. If some states adopt considerably stricter rules while others retain more permissive procedures, national restrictions could lose force inside a zone designed to remove most internal border checks. A common regime would need to be precise enough for officials to use at external borders and robust enough to withstand legal challenges.
The dispute is therefore about more than tourism. It tests whether the EU can turn a shared concern about Russian-linked hybrid activity into a single operating standard without replacing individual assessment with a general presumption of guilt. The January 2027 proposal will determine whether Brussels opts for fewer visas, stronger case-by-case checks, a wider exclusion of former military personnel or a narrower compromise. Until then, the rules remain largely unchanged while national governments press for a response they consider both faster and more coordinated.
