Poland is preparing a legal framework for responding to serious security threats before the country reaches the threshold for martial law. The proposed “pre-war law” is intended to bring the armed forces, security services, central government and local authorities into a faster, more clearly defined system for handling hybrid crises.
Polish media reported on 8 October 2026 that the government was working on measures to strengthen national and public preparedness for possible military threats. The initiative is still at the preparation stage, and the precise powers that any final legislation would create have not yet been set out.
The gap between an incident and an emergency
The proposal is aimed at a difficult interval in which a threat may be too serious for ordinary procedures but not yet serious enough, legally, to trigger martial law. Sabotage, cyberattacks, disruption to critical infrastructure and breaches of airspace can demand decisions within minutes, even when there has been no declared armed attack.
In such circumstances, the first obstacle may not be a lack of resources but uncertainty over responsibility. Several bodies could be involved in assessing the danger, authorising a response and carrying it out. If their roles are not established in advance, time can be lost while officials determine who is in charge or how military support should be coordinated with civilian agencies.
The proposed framework is intended to settle those questions before a crisis begins. Its stated purpose is to shorten the distance between detecting a danger and implementing a response, while keeping the state within a legal order that falls short of martial law.
Security planning beyond the military
The project would cover more than the deployment of troops. It is also expected to strengthen civil-protection mechanisms, improve crisis management and prepare infrastructure for use in exceptional circumstances.
That approach reflects the wider security lessons of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine. Military capability remains central to national defence, but a major crisis can also test communications, transport, energy, medical services and the continuity of public administration. A state may need to protect essential services at the same time as security agencies investigate an attack and commanders prepare a military response.
Local government would therefore form an important part of the proposed system. Evacuations, shelter, transport routes, medical capacity and the continuation of public services are practical responsibilities that often fall to local or regional authorities. Those tasks are harder to organise once communications have been disrupted or several areas are affected at once.
The information currently available does not specify what new obligations, if any, would apply directly to the public. Nor does it describe the funding, equipment or administrative changes that would be needed to put the proposed arrangements into practice. Those details will depend on the draft eventually published and the legislative process that follows.
When could the armed forces act?
One of the most significant elements concerns the use of Poland’s armed forces during a hybrid threat. The issue is particularly sensitive when a crisis involves a possible violation of Polish airspace or suspected sabotage. Such incidents could require an immediate response without automatically constituting an open military attack or meeting the conditions for martial law.
A clearer chain of decision-making could reduce delays and conflicting instructions. It could establish how military units support civilian authorities, which institution authorises that support and how information passes between the army, security services, government departments and local administrations.
But faster action does not remove the need for defined limits. The eventual rules would need to clarify the circumstances in which military involvement is permitted, the scope of that involvement and the responsibilities that remain with civilian authorities. Broad powers without precise conditions could create uncertainty over oversight and accountability even as the government tried to make the state more responsive.
Planning for a crisis before the crisis
Warsaw’s proposed solution is based on preparing for possible scenarios rather than improvising during each emergency. The intended framework would give state institutions a common procedure for responding to an external danger that is grave enough to require coordinated national action, but has not yet crossed the formal threshold of war or martial law.
That is also the space in which hybrid operations can be particularly difficult to manage. A hostile act may be limited, concealed or carried out through disruption rather than direct force. The response may depend as much on reliable information and administrative coordination as on military strength.
The project’s practical significance will become clearer only when its provisions are made public. For now, its central challenge is apparent: Poland wants the state to act more quickly when infrastructure, communications or airspace are threatened, without creating an undefined zone in which authority, responsibility and civilian control become blurred. The report on the initiative was published by InPoland.
