Russia’s war against Ukraine is pushing Europe into one of the most uncertain and dangerous periods since the full-scale invasion, with the conflict increasingly testing the security of the European Union itself.
As Le Monde reports, Ukraine’s allies are facing several risks at once: intensifying Russian strikes, hybrid operations on European territory, uncertainty over the durability of US support and questions over how long Russia’s economy can continue financing the war.
The concern is no longer confined to the battlefield. European governments are having to prepare for a conflict whose effects reach into transport networks, critical infrastructure, intelligence operations and the wider system of deterrence on which the continent’s security has rested.
The war has moved beyond the front line
Each summer of the war has brought a new expansion of the confrontation. In 2022, the main fighting was concentrated in eastern and southern Ukraine. The following year, the conflict increasingly spread into the Black Sea and Crimea. In the summer of 2024, Ukrainian forces launched their first major ground operation on Russian territory, in the Kursk region.
Since 2025, both sides have significantly increased long-range strikes against targets deep inside enemy territory. The cost of that escalation is rising, including for civilians, while the distinction between the war in Ukraine and the security of neighbouring European states becomes harder to sustain.
One of the most serious episodes cited in the assessment was an alleged attempt on 5 August to attack a Ukrainian military transport aircraft at Leipzig airport using a kamikaze drone. The incident is presented as part of a wider set of actions attributed to Moscow beyond Ukraine, rather than as an isolated security breach.
At the same time, the Kremlin has increased pressure on European countries over Russia’s so-called shadow fleet: vessels linked to Russian interests that are used to maintain maritime routes and reduce the impact of restrictions. After the detention of Russia-linked ships, Vladimir Putin threatened to “respond in kind” if European states continued such operations.
Europe is being forced to plan for a wider confrontation
Olivier Schmitt, a professor at the Institute for Military Operations at the Royal Danish Defence College, said Russia’s hybrid campaign had not begun recently. “The difference is that now the general public understands the scale of what is happening much better,” he said.
For European governments, another source of uncertainty is the United States. Schmitt described Europe as facing a “double vulnerability”: limited American stocks of ammunition and doubts about Washington’s ability to use military deterrence effectively.
Western intelligence services are also examining more closely the possibility that Russia could test Nato’s resilience. An earlier US intelligence assessment suggested that a potential “window of risk” could open as early as autumn 2026 and remain open until 2029.
That prospect changes the calculations facing European capitals. The war in Ukraine was once viewed chiefly as a conflict tying down a large share of Russia’s military resources. Increasingly, attention is turning to a scenario in which Moscow could put pressure on Ukraine while simultaneously testing the resolve of European allies.
Deterrence must become more European
Previous years have shown that many of Russia’s earlier red lines did not prevent western countries from supplying Ukraine with modern weapons and substantial financial assistance. Experts therefore expect Moscow to seek new ways of raising the cost of European support for Kyiv.
Those methods include sabotage, cyber-attacks, information operations, threats to infrastructure and pressure on transport routes. Their purpose, according to the assessment, is not necessarily to produce a single decisive strike, but to exploit vulnerabilities and make continued backing for Ukraine more politically and materially difficult.
The response would require Europe to accelerate the development of its defence industry, increase ammunition production, strengthen air defences, protect critical infrastructure and improve intelligence cooperation. The underlying conclusion is that Ukraine’s security and the security of the EU can no longer be treated as separate questions.
A test of endurance
Russia’s economic resilience remains another central uncertainty. Western strategy is built partly around reducing the Kremlin’s financial ability to sustain a prolonged war through pressure on oil revenues, sanctions, restrictions on the shadow fleet and technology controls.
Russia continues to seek alternative financial and logistical routes to bypass some of those constraints. The confrontation is therefore becoming a test of endurance as much as a contest of military capability.
For Europe, the decisive issue is whether the EU can become a geopolitical actor able to protect its security with greater independence, or whether Moscow will continue to use European weaknesses as instruments of pressure. Ukraine remains the first line of defence in that contest, but the consequences of failure would not stop at its borders.
Can Europe build a credible, more self-reliant system of deterrence before the projected risk window opens?
