Germany is facing a persistent Russian influence network of at least 3,000 active or ‘sleeping’ agents, informants and influential figures, according to assessments cited by German experts. The network is believed to extend from Russian-speaking communities and cultural organisations to sports clubs, the police and the Bundeswehr, raising concerns about espionage, sabotage and attempts to destabilise the country from within.
A report published by news.de on 22 August 2026 said the estimated figure included people who could be activated when required, as well as those already engaged in activities serving Russian interests. The assessment presents the network not as a collection of isolated spies, but as a broad infrastructure of influence with access to social, political and potentially sensitive security environments.
A network reaching beyond traditional espionage
The range of locations and institutions considered of interest is extensive. Banks, insurance companies, shipyards, oil refineries and power stations are among the targets identified in the report. Access to such sites could provide information useful for intelligence gathering, while also creating opportunities for disruption or the preparation of future acts of sabotage.
Experts are particularly concerned by paramilitary formations operating under the cover of martial arts sections and Cossack groups. Their appearance as clubs or community organisations can make them less conspicuous than conventional military structures, while still allowing networks to build discipline, contacts and operational capability.
The warning also highlights the use of ‘one-off agents’ recruited for individual acts of espionage or sabotage. Such people may be given a limited task rather than brought into a long-term clandestine organisation. That approach can make detection more difficult and allows Russian networks to draw on individuals who may not regard themselves as professional agents.
Expulsions have not ended the activity
Germany has expelled more than 80 Russian agents since the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Yet the activity of Russian influence networks has continued, according to the material. The persistence of the networks suggests that expulsions alone have not removed the structures, contacts and recruitment channels that enable Moscow to maintain a presence inside Germany.
The concern is therefore not limited to the number of people identified by German authorities. A network can retain value through informants, sympathisers and influential figures who are not publicly recognised as intelligence officers. ‘Sleeping’ agents may remain inactive for long periods, but could be called upon during a political crisis, a period of heightened military tension or an organised influence operation.
That uncertainty makes the threat difficult to measure. The estimate of at least 3,000 people refers to active and dormant agents, informants and influential individuals together; it does not mean that all are carrying out espionage or preparing an attack at the same time. Its significance lies in the potential pool available to Russian interests and the variety of environments in which that pool may operate.
Influence as part of a wider confrontation
German experts view the networks as part of the hybrid confrontation between Russia and Europe. In this context, influence operations are not separate from security threats: information campaigns, political pressure, recruitment, espionage, sabotage and possible acts of physical disruption can reinforce one another.
The issue is especially sensitive because Kremlin influence can reach into domestic politics. The material points to the growing strength of far-right forces in Germany as an important reason for concern. Tolerating pro-Russian influence in that environment, the assessment argues, could give Moscow additional opportunities to shape political debate, exploit social divisions and encourage internal destabilisation.
The immediate challenge for Germany is to distinguish legitimate community, cultural and political activity from networks being used in Russia’s interests, without allowing those networks to operate unchecked. The continued activity reported after dozens of expulsions indicates that the question is no longer simply how many agents have been uncovered, but how deeply the wider infrastructure has taken root.
How should Germany balance stronger action against Russian influence networks with the need to avoid treating entire communities and organisations as security threats?
