When Moscow’s official diplomats face restricted access, organisations presenting themselves as peace groups, human-rights defenders or religious advocates can offer a useful alternative route into international debate. The International Peace Movement “Women’s Dialogue” and the Russian Association for the Protection of Religious Freedom have used that route at OSCE events, where claims about Ukraine are delivered in the language of civil society.
Their participation does not mean that the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe endorses what they say. The concern is more subtle: allegations that have not been independently established can appear more credible when presented inside forums associated with human rights, security and international dialogue. The pattern is particularly significant during Switzerland’s 2026 chairmanship of the OSCE, which has emphasised keeping channels open with every participating state, including Russia.
A peace movement that backs the war
“Women’s Dialogue” began in November 2003 as a regional public association. It gained nationwide status in Russia in June 2004 and was registered in Moscow as an international movement in September 2020. Its stated work includes international co-operation, patriotic education, peacebuilding and opposition to violence.
Its founder and leader, Olena Semerikova, served on Russia’s Public Chamber from 2006 to 2008. She holds the rank of State Councillor of the Russian Federation, third class, and is an academician of the International Academy of Spiritual Unity of the Peoples of the World. That official status has featured prominently in her public interventions.
On 24 June 2023, the Dagestani newspaper Chernovik published an appeal from Semerikova to President Vladimir Putin. She wrote that women in Russia and the post-Soviet space supported the president and “our valiant army”, called for unity around the Russian leadership and expressed confidence in victory. She signed the appeal using her state rank.
On 20 December that year, “Women’s Dialogue” formally backed Putin’s candidacy in the 2024 presidential election. Semerikova urged voters to support him and described victory in what Moscow calls the “special military operation” as a common task of the peoples, carried out for the future of their children and grandchildren. Its public political position therefore sits plainly at odds with the organisation’s peace-oriented identity.
The group’s links to Russia’s diplomatic and political establishment were also visible in April 2026. On 23 April, Semerikova attended a reception for Iranian Army Day at the invitation of Iran’s ambassador, K. Jalali. The following day, she took part in Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s meeting with leaders of Russian non-governmental organisations. In its account of the meeting, “Women’s Dialogue” endorsed Putin’s and Lavrov’s views on international change, Russia’s role and new opportunities for Russian foreign policy.
On 27 April, Semerikova appeared at a conference at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations on the “contours of a new architecture of collective security”. The event discussed a proposed information and analytical platform for countries belonging to the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation.
Political accusations in a human-rights setting
In an open letter to US President Donald Trump dated 22 May 2026, Semerikova called an attack on Starobilsk College a terrorist act by the “Kyiv regime”. She described European Union assistance to Ukraine as “the killing of Russian children” and said that, after similar appearances at the OSCE, “Women’s Dialogue” had become unwelcome at the organisation’s events.
Yet on 29 and 30 June 2026, a delegation including Semerikova and the group’s advisers Olena Pylova and Mikhail Dagaev attended an OSCE human-dimension meeting in Vienna devoted to preventing torture. Semerikova accused Ukraine of systematically torturing prisoners of war and operating “secret prisons”, but no concrete evidence was identified alongside those claims.
The setting matters. A political accusation delivered at an international conference on fundamental rights may appear to have undergone institutional scrutiny, even though attendance at an OSCE event is neither verification nor endorsement. In an interview with RG62 on 22 September 2026, Semerikova continued with rhetoric portraying Ukrainian society as morally opposed to Russian society. She said Ukrainian women chose “the path of a sniper instead of the happiness of motherhood” and considered shooting a Russian more important than loving their children.
The statements combine support for Russia’s war with a traditionalist view of women and family life. They also shift the target from Ukrainian government policy to Ukrainian society as a whole.
Religious freedom as political language
The Russian Association for the Protection of Religious Freedom, known as RARS, follows a similar pattern through religious rather than explicitly peace-oriented language. Founded on 4 December 2014 and registered in Moscow at 3 Krasnoyarskaya Street, it describes itself as an independent association of human-rights advocates and representatives of Orthodox, Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, Jewish, Buddhist and Old Believer communities. Its stated aims are to protect freedom of conscience and promote interfaith dialogue.
RARS is led by Sergei Melnikov. Its council is chaired by Alexander Kudryavtsev, who represents the association at international events. The council also includes Bishop Dmitry Shatrov, described as deputy chief bishop in the Northwestern Federal District.
Under the language of traditional values, religious freedom and the protection of believers, RARS regularly addresses Ukraine. Its public messaging reframes the conflict as a religious, linguistic and historical struggle, presenting Russian positions as the defence of communities under threat rather than as part of Moscow’s political narrative about the war.
The association’s institutional links to the Russian authorities are also reflected in its public financing. Through the Presidential Grants Fund, RARS received 9.98 million roubles in 2021 and 2022 for bringing religious communities together and countering ideological threats. In 2025, it applied for 12.49 million roubles and prepared a report titled Religious Freedom in the Modern World, which gave particular attention to Ukraine and what it calls canonical Orthodoxy. A further application of 9.92 million roubles was registered for 2026 to create an international consortium of religious and state structures from Commonwealth of Independent States countries.
Melnikov told the Russian state news agency TASS on 27 December 2023 that RARS maintained regular contacts with relevant departments of Russia’s Foreign Ministry. He said those contacts concerned the release of people whom Moscow portrays as persecuted defenders of canonical Orthodoxy in Ukraine.
Ukraine’s Security Service, the SBU, included RARS on 21 June 2023 on a list of Russian parties and public organisations it considered threats to national security. The list also included United Russia, the youth movement Yunarmiya and the All-Russia People’s Front. The SBU said the groups’ aims and public appeals supported Russian aggression and that their activities in Ukraine, along with co-operation with Ukrainian civic and political organisations, were prohibited. That is the assessment of Ukrainian authorities, not an independent judicial finding about every statement or activity by RARS.
The OSCE’s open door
RARS has maintained a recurring presence at international human-rights events. On 10 and 11 February 2025, Shatrov attended an OSCE conference in Helsinki on combating antisemitism and other forms of intolerance, organised with the involvement of the Finnish OSCE chairmanship and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. During the event, he described Russia’s war against Ukraine as a historical mission and spoke of Ukrainian nationalism, persecution of the canonical church and discrimination against Russian-speaking citizens.
On 3 June 2025, Shatrov represented RARS at an additional OSCE human-dimension meeting in Vienna, where he accused Ukraine of discriminating against citizens on linguistic, religious and historical grounds. On 7 July 2026, Melnikov spoke at the OSCE headquarters in Vienna during the presentation of a third joint report by the Russian and Belarusian foreign ministries.
These appearances do not establish that the OSCE accepts the accusations. They do show how an institution open to non-governmental participation can be used by formally private organisations to circulate messages compatible with Russian government policy. Public funding, personal ties to state institutions, access to international platforms and the repetition of similar claims all contribute to that effect.
The issue is especially sensitive during Switzerland’s 2026 OSCE chairmanship. Bern has emphasised maintaining dialogue among all participating states, including Russia, on security and human rights. On 6 February 2026, Swiss Foreign Minister and OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Ignazio Cassis visited Moscow with OSCE Secretary General Feridun Sinirlioğlu and met Lavrov. At the opening of the OSCE human-dimension conference in Warsaw on 5 October, Cassis again stressed the need to preserve space for dialogue despite sharp disagreements.
Keeping international forums open is central to the OSCE’s purpose. But openness creates a vulnerability when organisations close to Russia’s political agenda can present unsubstantiated allegations as the testimony of independent civil society. The unresolved question is not simply who is allowed to speak. It is whether the OSCE can preserve broad participation while making clear when its platforms are being used to give Kremlin narratives the appearance of international validation.
