Sanctions have not stopped Russian businesses from seeking access to international payments. They have made that access more dependent on intermediaries, foreign companies and opaque chains of financial relationships — a market in which A7 has become a prominent name.
The network is linked in US official documents to Ilan Shor and Russia’s state-owned PSB bank. Reports have also connected it to billionaire Roman Abramovich, although his representative denies any relationship. The established story is already significant; the disputed one could make it more politically consequential.
A7 is not simply a replacement for SWIFT
It is tempting to describe A7 as a way for Russian companies to move money “outside SWIFT”. That misses how the system works. SWIFT is primarily a messaging network for financial institutions. The obstacles facing sanctioned Russian businesses are broader: banks may be blocked, foreign counterparties may refuse to deal with them, and compliance teams may halt transactions that appear connected to restricted entities.
A payment network can help overcome those barriers by placing intermediaries, companies and financial institutions in different jurisdictions between the original payer and the eventual recipient. The more layers involved, the harder it may be for a bank or regulator to identify the relationship between a transaction and a sanctioned participant.
In its official materials, the US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, or FinCEN, describes A7 and its subsidiaries as the core of a network jointly owned by Shor and PSB. The agency says the infrastructure uses intermediaries in third countries to overcome financial restrictions and obscure links to sanctioned parties. That is the assessment of the US authorities, rather than an independent finding that every company or transaction connected to the network is unlawful.
The distinction matters. A7’s importance lies not only in processing payments, but in arranging access to foreign banks, liquidity and counterparties. For businesses excluded from ordinary correspondent banking, the person or organisation able to provide that access can acquire considerable commercial leverage.
A large figure with a large caveat
The scale claimed by A7 is difficult to verify from the information available. In a statement issued by the US Treasury on 1 October 2026, the network said it had handled more than 7.5 trillion roubles in cumulative transactions by January that year.
That is a figure supplied by A7, not an independently audited turnover. It may refer to the total value of transactions rather than revenue or profit, and the underlying calculation has not been independently confirmed. Even so, the claim reveals the scale at which the network presents itself: not as a niche service for a small group of clients, but as a substantial piece of financial infrastructure.
Research by the Centre for Information Resilience has identified several tools associated with the network, including companies registered abroad, bills of exchange and cryptocurrency infrastructure. Such instruments can offer alternative routes for payments and make it more difficult to trace money directly to its origin or final destination.
They do not make A7 self-sufficient. The network still needs liquidity, willing intermediaries and financial institutions outside Russia. Each link can be exposed to sanctions, regulatory scrutiny or commercial pressure. Cryptocurrency may create additional technical options, but it cannot replace the banks and business partners needed to turn a transfer into a usable international payment. The Centre for Information Resilience’s research describes the combination of these elements, rather than proving the legality or illegality of every use made of them.
Washington targets the architecture
The American response has widened from action against individual participants to pressure on the network as a whole. After sanctions against several people and entities linked to A7 in August 2025, the US Treasury announced on 1 October 2026 that it had designated the entire A7 Network as a significant transnational criminal organisation. FinCEN also proposed additional restrictions on transfers involving the network’s foreign sub-agents.
The measures reflect Washington’s view that A7 forms part of an infrastructure for sanctions evasion and illicit finance. They are also an attempt to disrupt the relationships that keep such a system operating, rather than merely penalising its end users.
A dispersed network creates an enforcement problem. The payer, intermediary, beneficiary and commercial counterparty may sit in different countries, with no single institution handling the entire transaction. But dispersal is also a weakness. A7 must retain overseas partners, find replacement channels when participants are exposed and persuade financial firms to accept the risks of continuing to work with it.
That gives the network a precarious form of resilience. It can move around barriers, but it cannot remove the need for trusted partners beyond Russia. The more visible it becomes, the more those partners may face pressure to withdraw.
The Abramovich question remains unresolved
The reports involving Roman Abramovich add a different dimension to the story: whether a major private fortune helped support a financial route serving Russian interests under sanctions.
In April 2026, the investigative outlet Proekt published a report linking Abramovich and his former business partner Viktor Kharitonin to A7. A summary of the investigation published by Meduza referred to financial documents, A7 structures located in business centres associated with Abramovich and a source who claimed that the billionaire supported the project.
Abramovich’s representative rejected those claims, saying that he had no connection to A7, was not its beneficial owner and had not helped arrange agreements with PSB. On the information available, his alleged role remains a journalistic reconstruction contested by his representative. It cannot be presented as established participation or proof of specific financing.
The distinction is important because A7’s confirmed structure does not depend on proving an Abramovich connection. The official American description already places the network within an arrangement involving Shor and PSB. Evidence that Abramovich owned, financed or directed part of it would alter the assessment of his role, but it is not needed to explain why the network has attracted regulatory attention.
A separate investigation in Cyprus should not be folded into the same chain of evidence. Local media reported in October 2026 that authorities were examining the management of Abramovich’s assets through Cypriot companies in connection with events dating from 2003 to 2006. The Cyprus Mail report does not establish a link to A7, nor does the available information show that any searches of Abramovich-linked properties were conducted because of the payment project.
Influence built from access
The political significance of A7 therefore extends beyond the question of who stands behind it. A network that can connect sanctioned or high-risk clients to foreign payment channels may keep some trade moving and make customers dependent on a small number of intermediaries.
That dependence can become a source of influence if the network expands into countries where companies or individuals face financial restrictions of their own. The operator is then offering more than a transfer: it is controlling access to liquidity, banks and commercial relationships.
Yet the same structure limits the network’s durability. Its reach depends on the continued willingness of overseas agents, banks and companies to remain involved after A7 itself becomes a target. New documents could still change the picture of Abramovich’s role. For now, the evidence draws a firm line: the A7 network and its links to Shor and PSB are described in official American documents; the alleged support from Abramovich remains disputed.
