Belarusian activists and political migrants in the United States are reporting messages from strangers who claim to be Belarusian law-enforcement officers. The callers and messengers ask about protests, political beliefs and activities abroad, then threaten to pass the information to US immigration authorities.
The reported tactic draws power from an uncertainty that is both political and legal: fear of retaliation by Alexander Lukashenko’s government is being linked to the immigration vulnerability of some Belarusians in the United States. The identity of the people behind the messages has not been established, and there is no confirmation that they act for Belarusian state agencies.
Questions, then a warning about ICE
Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s office publicised the cases on 5 November 2026. It said unknown individuals had contacted Belarusians in the US through messaging applications while presenting themselves as employees of Belarusian law-enforcement bodies.
The reported questions focused on whether the recipients had taken part in protests, what political positions they held and what they were doing outside Belarus. The contacts were then followed by warnings that information about them could be sent to Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or ICE, the US agency responsible for enforcing immigration law and carrying out removals.
The Belarusian service of Deutsche Welle reported the allegations but did not identify the senders or provide evidence linking them to Belarusian authorities. That leaves several possibilities open: the messages could be part of an organised campaign, an impersonation effort by private individuals, or separate attempts to frighten people who are already exposed because of their immigration status.
Leonid Morozov, a legal adviser to Tsikhanouskaya, described the reported conduct as a possible sign of transnational repression. He advised recipients to preserve the messages and other identifying details, then report the threats to the FBI.
Why an unverified threat can still work
The alleged method does not require the sender to have real access to US immigration officials. Someone awaiting a decision on asylum or another application, relying on temporary protection or worried about detention may still fear that political activity could be used against them.
That is the mechanism at the centre of the reports. A conflict rooted in Belarusian politics is made to appear capable of reaching into the US immigration system. The recipient may have no way of knowing whether the sender possesses genuine information or is simply pretending to do so, while the possible consequences of an adverse immigration decision are clear enough.
A warning about participation in a demonstration, work with a diaspora organisation or criticism of the Belarusian government can therefore influence behaviour even if it is baseless. People may stop attending protests, withdraw from community groups or limit what they say publicly. The pressure can take the form of silence and distrust before any intervention by US authorities has occurred.
It may also affect people who were never contacted. If activists believe that their names, political views or public activities could be passed to ICE, organisations may struggle to reassure members that taking part is safe. Personal details shared for community work can begin to look like potential liabilities, while online conversations become harder to trust.
A wider Belarusian pattern, but no confirmed link
Tsikhanouskaya’s office has presented the incidents as an extension abroad of the repression associated with Lukashenko’s government. Opposition figures, independent journalists and civic activists in Belarus have faced sustained pressure since the disputed presidential election of 2020 and the mass protests that followed.
That background helps explain why the reported contacts have been interpreted as possible transnational repression. It does not, by itself, establish who sent the individual messages in the United States. Circumstantial similarities and the use of Belarusian official identities are not proof of direction by Belarusian security services.
The distinction matters for both the people being threatened and the organisations trying to respond. Treating every suspicious message as an official operation could obscure opportunistic harassment. But assuming that an impersonator poses no danger would also miss the practical effect of the threats: they are designed, or at least able, to exploit existing fears about surveillance and deportation.
Immigration insecurity gives the threat its force
The warnings have reportedly reached a community in which some people are already uncertain about their legal status. ByAction, a civic initiative, estimates that more than 3,000 Belarusians in the United States face a risk of deportation. It also says that at least 89 Belarusian citizens were detained and placed in immigration detention centres between the beginning of 2026 and August.
Those figures are attributed to ByAction and have not been independently verified in the available reporting. They nevertheless indicate why the mention of ICE could carry particular weight. Someone already worried about detention or removal may treat an unsupported warning as an immediate danger, even without evidence that the sender can contact an official or influence a case.
The threat exploits an asymmetry. The recipient cannot easily determine whether the person behind a message has access to official records, while the consequences being invoked — detention, scrutiny or deportation — are concrete. Uncertainty becomes a form of pressure in its own right.
For people who left Belarus to escape political persecution, the effect can be especially corrosive. Changing countries may have removed them from the direct reach of Belarusian authorities, but it has not necessarily removed the fear that political activity will bring consequences. By invoking ICE, the unknown senders place that fear against the realities of the US immigration system.
Identifying the senders is the crucial next step
It remains unclear whether the reported messages form a coordinated operation, whether individuals are borrowing the authority of Belarusian institutions, or whether several unrelated intimidators are using the same script. Establishing that would require comparison of the messages, phone numbers, accounts and other technical details, as well as evidence of links between the contacts.
For now, the narrower conclusion is the strongest one supported by the reports: Belarusians in the United States are receiving threats that combine political intimidation with the possibility of immigration consequences. The unresolved question is not whether such messages can frighten people, but who is sending them — and whether the fear they create is being directed from Minsk or exploited by imitators.
