NATO is due to begin its Steadfast Noon exercise in Italy on 13 October 2026, with air forces from 17 member states rehearsing procedures linked to nuclear deterrence. No live nuclear warheads will be used, but the planned drills have already become a political flashpoint before the first aircraft take part.
The exercise comes as European governments remain focused on Russia’s nuclear rhetoric and the wider deterioration of the continent’s security environment. In Italy, however, the immediate argument is less about what the aircraft will do than about what a highly visible nuclear exercise says to the public: does it strengthen deterrence, or make the prospect of escalation feel more real?
The date and broad outline of the activity were reported on 11 October in a Telegram post. The information available describes a multinational training operation on Italian territory, rather than a live weapons deployment.
What the exercise is designed to test
Steadfast Noon will rehearse scenarios associated with NATO’s nuclear-deterrence mission. Participating aircraft and crews are expected to practise coordination, readiness and procedures that would be required during a severe security crisis.
That distinction matters. The exercise does not involve the use of operational nuclear warheads, nor does the available information describe an imminent military operation. Its purpose is to train allied forces in a controlled setting, allowing them to test how they would work together without waiting for an actual emergency.
The participation of 17 countries gives the drills a significance beyond the individual flights. Nuclear deterrence depends not only on weapons and delivery systems, but also on whether allied forces can communicate, follow compatible procedures and maintain coordination under pressure. A multinational exercise is intended to test that collective readiness.
For NATO, such preparation is part of a defensive posture. The alliance’s argument is that credible readiness can help deter aggression by demonstrating that its members are capable of acting together. The same visibility, however, creates a communications problem: an exercise designed to reduce the risk of miscalculation can also remind the public how serious the underlying threat is.
Bonelli brings the dispute into Italian politics
Angelo Bonelli, an opposition MP from Italy’s Alliance of Greens and Left, used the announcement to criticise the Italian Defence Ministry and raise concerns about the dangers associated with NATO activity. His intervention has made the exercise a domestic political issue before the training begins.
Bonelli’s position places the emphasis on the risks of conducting and publicising exercises with a nuclear dimension. Even without live warheads, the terminology of nuclear deterrence can make confrontation appear more immediate. Critics may therefore argue that such manoeuvres increase public anxiety or contribute to an atmosphere of escalation.
Supporters of the drills would frame the issue differently. On that view, the danger lies not in rehearsing procedures but in allowing allied readiness to weaken while the security environment becomes more uncertain. The exercise is therefore presented as a precaution: a way to ensure that NATO members understand their roles and can coordinate if a crisis develops.
The available information establishes Bonelli’s criticism, but it does not establish that he was acting on behalf of Russia or as part of a coordinated foreign influence operation. Claims that his intervention amounts to an information operation remain an interpretation rather than a demonstrated fact. Opposition to a military exercise, on its own, is not proof of covert affiliation or foreign direction.
The political risk of showing preparedness
That distinction does not make the political dispute insignificant. Governments and military alliances must explain nuclear preparedness without suggesting that a nuclear confrontation is expected or imminent. A failure to demonstrate readiness may undermine confidence in deterrence; an overly dramatic presentation may deepen fear.
Italy’s debate reflects that tension. One side sees Steadfast Noon as a planned defensive measure shaped by a more dangerous European security climate. The other focuses on the possibility that public drills involving nuclear scenarios normalise the language of confrontation and make escalation seem unavoidable.
The exercise is temporary and will take place without real nuclear warheads. Its broader question will last longer: how visible should nuclear readiness be if the aim is to prevent conflict? NATO’s answer will be measured not only in the aircraft taking part, but also in whether the public sees the exercise as reassurance or as a warning.
