A Russian propaganda and hacking network has launched a fresh campaign of fabricated scandals against German politicians ahead of regional elections in Saxony-Anhalt, targeting figures whose parties oppose the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD).
The latest operation used a cloned version of the Süddeutsche Zeitung website to publish fake videos and articles accusing Saxony-Anhalt’s prime minister and CDU candidate, Sven Schulze, of imprisoning and beating an Afghan refugee child. The case was reported on 19 August 2026 by t-online, which identified the material as part of a Russian disinformation campaign.
A cloned newspaper site and an invented crime
The fabricated story claimed that an Afghan refugee boy had escaped from Schulze’s private property, where he had allegedly been held in a cellar and regularly assaulted. The allegation is entirely invented, but was presented in the form of a report apparently published by a respected German newspaper.
That method is central to the campaign. Rather than distributing obviously partisan propaganda, the operation imitates the websites and visual identity of established western media outlets, giving false stories the appearance of independent journalism. The aim is to make readers question whether a sensational allegation has been verified by a familiar and authoritative source.
The campaign is being conducted by Storm-1516, described in the material as a Russian propaganda and hacking network. Its attacks have focused on politicians from the Social Democratic party (SPD), the CDU, the Greens and the Left – parties that stand in opposition to the AfD or to the wider growth of far-right politics.
Sex, violence and Nazi associations
The allegation against Schulze follows a recognisable pattern. Previous fabrications attributed to the network have targeted senior German politicians with claims involving sex, violence or grotesque personal misconduct.
False stories have alleged that Friedrich Merz killed polar-bear cubs in Canada, that Annalena Baerbock paid for the services of a male escort in Africa, and that Robert Habeck was involved in a story about violence. Similar material has also been directed at Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the president of Ukraine, including a fabricated claim that he bought a villa once owned by Joseph Goebbels.
The selection of themes is significant. Sexual allegations, violence, refugees, Ukraine and links to Nazism are all highly emotive subjects in German public life. They are designed to provoke disgust and anger before readers have time to establish whether the claims are genuine. The use of a refugee child in the attack on Schulze also connects a personal scandal to one of the issues most readily exploited by the far right.
How disinformation serves the AfD
The campaign reflects a broader Russian practice associated with operations such as “Matryoshka”, which also relies on forged material supposedly produced by credible western media and invents scandals involving public figures. In each case, the credibility of the source is part of the deception: the false report is intended to circulate as evidence that a mainstream politician has something to hide.
By attacking government politicians and opponents of far-right parties, the Kremlin seeks to weaken confidence in traditional political organisations and democratic institutions. The objective is not necessarily to persuade voters of one detailed falsehood, but to create an information environment in which all established politicians and media organisations appear corrupt, dishonest or compromised.
That atmosphere benefits far-right and pro-Russian forces, including the AfD. If such parties gain power, the consequences identified in the material would extend beyond Germany’s domestic politics: support for Ukraine could be halted and Germany could become more dependent on Russia. The disinformation therefore operates both as an electoral intervention and as an attempt to reshape Germany’s future foreign-policy choices.
The immediate challenge is to prevent a fabricated story from acquiring political force simply because it has been packaged as journalism. With the latest attack aimed at a leading regional candidate and the wider campaign directed at politicians across the German mainstream, the continuing question is whether false scandals can erode trust faster than they can be exposed.
Will repeated Russian forgeries ultimately weaken Germany’s established parties, or could their exposure strengthen public resistance to the AfD’s political message?
