Russian intelligence agencies conducted a coordinated disinformation campaign aimed at disrupting the March 2026 municipal elections in France, according to a report by the French government’s digital interference monitoring service Viginum.
The campaign involved the use of cloned websites mimicking official local media and candidate pages, as well as fabricated video content spread through social media, Viginum said in its report published on July 3. The operation sought to support radical political forces aligned with Moscow and discredit pro-government candidates.
One notable targeted candidate was Pierre-Yves Bournazel, a centrist from the Horizons party running for mayor of Paris. Hackers created a replica of his campaign website and circulated a manipulated video falsely claiming he planned to turn the Centre Pompidou into a migrant reception center. Bournazel publicly called on Viginum to investigate the incident as foreign digital interference in the Paris municipal vote, and said the false narrative had negatively affected his campaign.
According to [Viginum’s report](https://www.france24.com/fr/france/20260703-municipales-comment-une-campagne-de-d%C3%A9sinformation-in%C3%A9dite-a-%C3%A9t%C3%A9-men%C3%A9e-depuis-isra%C3%ABl-contre-lfi), the Russian operation exploited sensitive issues in French society—migration and cultural heritage—to mobilize radical voters against mainstream candidates. The timing of the disinformation, released just before voting days, made official fact-checking and domain verification too slow to prevent electoral damage.
The report highlighted a shift in Russian tactics. In 2017, during the MacronLeaks operation, Russian military intelligence relied on hacking and leaking genuine documents. By 2026, they had moved to full fabrication of content, using cloned web resources and generative deepfakes to create convincing false material from scratch.
####Escalation since 2024
The wave of disinformation escalated notably in 2024, Viginum said, as a direct reaction to French President Emmanuel Macron’s statements about possibly sending French military instructors or units to Ukraine. Since then, Russian-linked actors have conducted nearly 80 coordinated disinformation operations targeting countries supporting Ukraine, with France as a primary focus.
Viginum noted that Russian information warfare in France has operated as a structured mechanism: state propaganda outlets set destructive narratives, so-called alternative media adapt them to the French context, and viral influencers and politicians amplify them through social networks. This creeping expansion aims to gradually undermine democratic institutions from within, the report warned.
The greatest danger, Viginum assessed, is that French opposition figures readily adopt fabricated content. Once a false video about migrants at the Pompidou Center circulates, radical politicians begin using it in their speeches. At that point, the external Russian operation becomes internal French political discourse, making it legally nearly impossible to counter, as it now appears as free speech by French citizens.
The Viginum report concluded that Russian covert information activities have evolved into an uncontrolled global threat to Western democracies, and that current verification and response mechanisms are insufficient against the speed and sophistication of modern disinformation campaigns.
