Russia has dramatically expanded its GPS spoofing infrastructure around Kaliningrad, enabling false navigation signals to reach up to 450 kilometres deep into NATO and EU territory, according to Lithuania’s communications regulator. Speaking to Reuters, deputy head Darius Kuliešius said the number of transmitting antennas inside the Russian exclave has increased from three in early 2025 to 36. The spoofed signals now cover most of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Belarus and parts of Finland and Sweden. Kuliešius described the interference as a systematic, continuous Russian provocation against European security, noting that sporadic disruptions began during the NATO summit in Vilnius in 2023.
Infrastructure for hybrid attacks
Unlike simple GPS jamming, which blocks signals, spoofing transmits false location data that can deceive aircraft, ships and drones into navigating incorrectly. The shift from occasional jamming to a permanent spoofing network indicates Moscow is building a dedicated capability for hybrid warfare. Because victims often do not realise they are being misled, spoofing poses a particular danger to civilian aviation, maritime logistics and any system relying on satellite-based time synchronisation, including financial networks and energy grids. For British operators, this means an elevated risk of navigation errors, flight delays, increased insurance costs and potential disruptions to just-in-time supply chains that depend on accurate positioning.
Risks to aviation and shipping
Several high-profile incidents have already involved UK military and ministerial aircraft. In March 2024, a British RAF plane carrying then defence secretary Grant Shapps experienced GPS jamming near Russian territory. On 21 May 2026, another UK defence secretary, John Healey, was on board an aircraft that suffered GPS interference close to the Russian border. Although most modern airliners and major airports have backup navigation systems, the rising frequency of spoofing increases the workload on safety systems and pushes up operational costs for airlines, insurers and governments. Baltic Sea shipping routes, vital for British trade with Scandinavia and the Baltic states, are also vulnerable to disorientation and delays.
Political pressure on NATO and the EU
The targeting of European leaders’ flights – including those of Spain’s defence minister in 2025 and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen – shows Moscow is also wielding spoofing as a political and psychological weapon. By demonstrating the ability to interfere with even the most protected government aircraft, the Kremlin aims to create an atmosphere of uncertainty and fear inside the Alliance. Experts argue that Europe must now treat GPS spoofing not as a series of local technical incidents but as a form of hybrid aggression requiring a coordinated diplomatic and legal response.
Implications for British interests
For the UK, the direct consequences range from higher air travel costs and insurance premiums to potential disruptions in financial markets that rely on GPS timing for transactions. British defence planners must also factor in the risk that spoofing could be used to mask more serious attacks or to degrade NATO’s response capabilities in a crisis. The government is likely to face pressure to support international complaints to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the United Nations, and to back new sanctions against Russian entities involved in electronic warfare and the Kaliningrad military infrastructure. As the spoofing network matures, the cost of adapting to this new threat will only rise for British taxpayers, businesses and travellers.
