Two pro-Russian European outlets have revived claims that confrontation with Russia and the abandonment of Russian energy supplies are driving the European Union towards economic collapse, despite data showing continued growth, falling dependence on Moscow and a rapidly changing energy system.
The Slovak publication Jednotne Slovensko published the argument on 14 September 2026, saying that incompetent leaders were responsible for high gas prices and that prolonged conflict with Russia harmed Europeans. The Czech outlet Pravý Prostor went further, declaring that the war against Russia had “buried” the EU economy and that the continent’s pan-European economic and financial model was collapsing.
Growth contradicts the collapse narrative
The claims do not match the main economic indicators cited in the material. Eurostat data show that the EU economy grew by 1.5% in 2025, up from 1.1% in 2024. The European Central Bank forecasts that the eurozone economy will expand by 0.9% in 2026, followed by growth of 1.4% in 2027 and 1.5% in 2028.
Unemployment remains close to historic lows at about 6%. That does not remove the economic pressures facing European households or businesses, but it points to an economy dealing with ordinary and serious challenges rather than one in freefall. The figures also undermine the suggestion that the EU’s response to Russia has already produced a general economic breakdown.
The financial system is similarly at odds with Pravý Prostor’s claim that the pan-European model has collapsed. Official European Commission economic reviews show that the euro remains the world’s second most important international currency. Its share of international use increased by about 20% in 2025, while its position in international payments and the foreign-exchange reserves of central banks remained at a consistently high level.
Europe has reduced its reliance on Russian gas
Abandoning Russian gas has created costs and exposed Europe to new risks, but it has not resulted in an energy collapse. The EU has instead moved rapidly to diversify supplies. Russian gas accounted for 45% of EU gas imports in 2021, or 152bn cubic metres. By 2025, the figure had fallen to 12%, or 36bn cubic metres.
Liquefied natural gas has taken a larger role, with Norway, the US, Azerbaijan and Qatar becoming important alternative suppliers. Russian LNG imports under long-term contracts are due to end on 1 January 2027. The change has sharply reduced a dependence that Russia had used as an instrument of political pressure.
The energy transition has not been painless. The European gas market remains heavily exposed to global LNG conditions, meaning that conflict in the Middle East and risks to international supply routes can intensify price volatility. Gas storage is about 67% full in 2026, requiring careful management of energy risks. But neither price concerns nor storage levels prove that the decision to move away from Russian supplies, or the EU’s REPowerEU plan, has failed.
A structural shift rather than a return to dependence
The reduction in Russian energy imports has also accelerated changes in the European power system. According to the public association SolarPower Europe, the EU’s combined solar-generation capacity reached 338GW in 2024. In June 2026, solar power supplied 25% of the bloc’s electricity generation for the first time.
Europe’s energy strategy is therefore increasingly based on diversified imports, LNG, energy efficiency and domestic generation, rather than a return to its previous reliance on Russian hydrocarbons. That shift creates a longer-term basis for greater energy independence, even while the immediate costs and vulnerabilities remain real.
Information pressure exploits genuine concerns
The publications’ message forms part of a wider Russian hybrid campaign against the EU. Russia has for years used information and psychological operations to discredit European institutions and weaken public confidence in national governments and EU leadership. The campaign relies on a network of state-aligned media, sympathetic politicians and pro-Russian outlets operating across European countries.
Its effectiveness depends partly on real anxieties over energy prices, economic conditions and the security consequences of the war. By presenting those problems as proof that the EU is collapsing, rather than as pressures being managed within a functioning and adapting economy, the narrative seeks to deepen political divisions and reduce European support for Ukraine.
The central unresolved issue is not whether Europe has faced economic disruption, but whether public debate will distinguish between the costs of restructuring and evidence of systemic failure. The answer will shape how much room such narratives have to undermine confidence in Europe’s energy choices and political cohesion.
Should European energy difficulties be treated primarily as evidence of policy failure, or as the short-term cost of reducing dependence on Russia?
