Poland is arguing increasingly loudly about its disputes with Ukraine while the country’s principal security danger remains Russia, Gen. Roman Polko has warned. The former commander of the GROM special forces unit says sabotage, cyberattacks, provocations, air strikes and disinformation are already part of the threat landscape — and that public attention is being pulled elsewhere.
Polish media reported Polko’s comments on 3 October 2026. His criticism is aimed at more than the tone of the political debate. He also questions whether central and local authorities are explaining the risks clearly enough to a population that may have to recognise hostile activity before it resembles a conventional attack.
A threat that does not always look like war
Polko’s warning rests on a broad definition of Russian pressure. An open military assault is only one possible form. Sabotage can damage infrastructure; cyberattacks can interrupt services or expose sensitive systems; provocations can test a government’s judgement; and disinformation can deepen distrust without a single shot being fired.
These methods are difficult to identify in isolation. A cyberattack may first appear to be a technical fault. A false story can look like part of an ordinary political quarrel. A disruption may cause confusion without immediately revealing who caused it or what purpose it serves. Together, such actions can put pressure on public institutions and test the resilience of a country on NATO’s eastern flank.
Polko is making a strategic assessment, not presenting an independently measured ranking of every risk facing Poland. But his central argument is clear: Russia remains the main external danger in his view, while the national conversation is increasingly dominated by arguments involving Ukraine.
Real disputes, distorted priorities
Poland and Ukraine have genuine disagreements, including over historical questions and economic interests. Polko’s point is not that those disputes should be suppressed or treated as unimportant. It is that they should not become the organising principle of Poland’s entire security debate.
When conflict with Ukraine becomes the focus of domestic political mobilisation, a partner with which Poland has serious disagreements can begin to appear as the defining threat. Russia, meanwhile, risks receding from view even as the means of pressure attributed to it become more varied.
That shift matters beyond political language. Prolonged tension between Poland and Ukraine could make coordination more difficult if it affects the exchange of information, political trust or practical cooperation. The two countries do not occupy the same position: Poland is a NATO member on the alliance’s eastern flank, while Ukraine is directly confronting Russian aggression. Yet their security environments are closely connected.
The concern, then, is one of hierarchy. Warsaw can defend its interests and challenge Kyiv over bilateral questions without presenting those disagreements as the country’s central strategic problem. A dispute with a partner is not automatically equivalent to aggression from an adversary.
Why official guidance may not be enough
Polko has also criticised the way authorities prepare the public. He says citizens are not being given an effective explanation of what hybrid threats might look like or how they should respond to them. His criticism applies to both national and local government.
In comments reported by Rzeczpospolita, Polko objected to directing people towards a government preparedness guide without doing enough to explain the dangers themselves. A handbook can provide useful procedures, but it cannot replace regular communication in plain language.
People need to know which sources are official, how to assess claims circulating online and what to do when essential services fail. They also need to understand that a security incident may begin with a rumour, a digital outage or an unexplained disruption rather than a visible military operation.
Without that shared understanding, individual events can quickly be absorbed into partisan narratives. A technical failure may be treated as proof of an attack; a fabricated report may spread before officials respond; and a genuine hostile operation may be dismissed as an everyday problem. Polko’s remarks do not independently establish how prepared the Polish public is, but they identify communication as a central part of national resilience.
The danger of letting division do the work
Hybrid pressure is not limited to physical damage. It can also exploit divisions that already exist. Public hostility towards Ukraine may arise from real grievances, and that alone does not demonstrate foreign direction or covert manipulation. But a deeply polarised debate can still consume political energy and make it harder to agree on the risks that require sustained preparation.
That is why Polko treats the framing of the Polish-Ukrainian relationship as a security issue as well as a diplomatic one. If every disagreement is elevated into evidence that Ukraine is Poland’s principal danger, the broader pressure from Russia becomes more difficult to discuss accurately.
The authorities therefore face two tasks at once. They must deal openly with legitimate disputes involving Ukraine, while ensuring that those disputes do not obscure the threats posed by sabotage, cyberattacks, provocations, air strikes and disinformation. They must also explain those threats in terms that reach beyond official documents.
Polko’s warning leaves Poland with a practical test: whether it can maintain political arguments with Ukraine without allowing them to define the country’s security priorities. The answer will shape not only public debate, but how quickly citizens recognise the next crisis when it arrives in a form that does not look like war.
