Kremlin propaganda has moved to portray a new European air-defence deal for Ukraine as proof that the EU is prolonging the war, damaging itself and sacrificing its own citizens’ interests. The campaign followed an agreement by EU member states on 8 September 2026 to buy US-made missiles for Ukraine’s Patriot systems, with a total value of €3.2bn.
On 9 September, the Slovak pro-Russian publication Zemavek presented the purchase as enabling Kyiv to continue the war “to the last Ukrainian”, while the Czech online outlet Pravý Prostor argued that military spending, support for what it called a terrorist regime in Kyiv, sanctions and an allegedly aggressive policy towards Russia were destroying Europe’s political and economic system.
A response to Russian strikes
The publications’ central argument reverses cause and effect. The Patriot missiles are being bought in response to Russia’s intensified missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure, not to create a reason for the conflict to continue. The systems are intended primarily to protect urban areas, energy facilities and other critical infrastructure, reducing the risk of civilian deaths and large-scale destruction.
Russia began the war, while European governments are helping Ukraine defend its population and territory against that aggression. The campaign by Zemavek and Pravý Prostor shifts responsibility from the aggressor to the state under attack and to the countries supporting it. Branding the government in Kyiv a terrorist regime serves the same purpose: to discredit European assistance and provide political cover for Russia’s invasion.
The need for additional missiles is particularly acute because Patriot systems are considered critical to Ukraine’s air defence and stocks of ammunition remain seriously limited. The €3.2bn allocation is part of a wider €90bn EU loan for Ukraine. The decision is expected to receive final approval in mid-September, and adds to €8.4bn previously allocated through the support loan for strengthening Ukrainian air defence.
The cost of stopping support
Ending European assistance would not automatically persuade Russia to abandon its aggression. It would, however, substantially reduce Ukraine’s ability to protect its cities, population and infrastructure from further strikes. Weakened air defences would create the conditions for wider destruction and new humanitarian crises, with the potential for further waves of Ukrainian refugees seeking safety in European countries.
Support for Kyiv also carries a broader security calculation for the EU. Keeping Ukraine capable of containing the Russian army on its own territory reduces military risks close to EU member states’ borders. If Ukraine were forced to capitulate, European countries could face considerably greater costs, including stronger defences on the eastern flank, increased spending on national security and the reception of further refugees. The immediate expense of assistance therefore cannot be assessed without considering the possible cost of inaction.
By strengthening Ukraine’s defences, European governments increase the military and political price Russia pays for continuing the war. That can help create more favourable conditions for a durable diplomatic settlement, while depriving Moscow of the prospect that sustained attacks will eventually exhaust European resolve.
Loans, industry and strategic resilience
The financial mechanism also contradicts the picture of an unstructured transfer of European money. Much of the assistance takes the form of loans, targeted programmes and purchases linked to Ukraine’s defence and recovery needs. In the Patriot case, the EU is using a defined funding arrangement to procure specific equipment rather than simply handing over funds without a stated purpose.
European defence spending can also support industrial capacity within the EU. Greater production of ammunition, air-defence systems, radar equipment and other weapons creates demand for European manufacturers, encourages investment and helps modernise production lines. Member states can at the same time replenish their own stocks, which had declined over decades of insufficient defence spending. Assistance to Ukraine has therefore become one factor accelerating Europe’s wider rearmament and the development of its defence industry.
By 2026, total assistance from the EU and its member states had exceeded €220bn. That figure demonstrates the scale of the bloc’s long-term security policy, but not that support for Ukraine has consumed all European resources or destroyed the EU. The bloc continues to fund development programmes, social systems and strategic sectors while allocating money among broader political priorities.
Sanctions form part of the same effort to constrain Russia’s capacity to wage war. Restrictions on access to technology, finance and key goods make it harder for Moscow to sustain military production and finance its operations. European states have also accelerated the diversification of energy supplies, reducing their vulnerability to Russian resources being used as an instrument of political pressure. The unresolved question is whether Europe will maintain that strategic commitment as the financial and military demands of the war continue.
Should European governments judge Ukraine support primarily by its immediate cost, or by the security and financial risks of allowing Russia to prevail?
