Roberto Vannacci is seeking the influence of a coalition partner without accepting the liabilities of government. The former Italian general and leader of National Future has set three conditions for supporting Giorgia Meloni’s centre-right alliance after the 2027 parliamentary election: ending aid to Ukraine, deporting about 2.4 million migrants he describes as “not integrated”, and abandoning the European Green Deal.
The demands, reported on 16 November 2026 in coverage of Vannacci’s interview with Politico, amount to a proposed negotiating position rather than an agreement with Meloni. But with National Future polling at about 7 per cent — roughly comparable with the League and Forza Italia, the prime minister’s existing coalition partners — Vannacci believes the arithmetic of the next parliament could give him disproportionate leverage.
He has also made clear that he does not want a ministerial post. Instead, he intends to remain an autonomous party leader, pressing a future government from outside. That would leave Meloni facing a potential ally who wants the power to shape policy while remaining formally detached from the decisions’ implementation and consequences.
A demand that would test Italy’s alliances
Vannacci’s call for a complete halt to Italian support for Ukraine would represent the sharpest break with Rome’s current foreign-policy position. Italy’s approach is bound up with its commitments to the European Union, NATO and the Group of Seven. A new government could review the scale or form of its assistance, but an abrupt end would raise questions among partners about Italy’s reliability in jointly agreed policy.
The proposal was reported by Il Giornale d’Italia and Agenzia Nova. Neither report establishes that Meloni has accepted the conditions or that a post-election arrangement exists.
Ending Italian assistance would not, by itself, decide the outcome of the war. It could nevertheless weaken the united position of European governments and signal that domestic coalition bargaining had displaced Italy’s existing commitments. That could strengthen Russia’s position on the eastern edge of the EU and make future decisions among European and transatlantic allies more difficult.
For Meloni, the choice would be uncomfortable in either direction. Rejecting Vannacci could complicate the formation of a majority if his party’s seats were needed. Accepting the demand could unsettle allies and force a dispute over whether Italy’s foreign policy could be redirected by a party with single-digit electoral support.
The scale of the deportation proposal
Vannacci’s second condition is the removal of about 2.4 million people whom he labels “not integrated”. The figure is equivalent to roughly 4 per cent of Italy’s population and is far broader than a conventional policy focused on people individually found to have no legal right to remain.
Putting such a proposal into practice would raise immediate legal and administrative questions. The authorities would have to define “not integrated”, identify those covered, examine individual circumstances and establish which countries would accept them. Constitutional protections, European Union rules and court procedures would all constrain the process. The destination countries’ willingness to receive people would be another unresolved issue.
The logistics would be formidable even before the question of legality was settled. Identification, hearings, detention and transport on that scale would require a large enforcement apparatus and substantial public spending. A mass-removal programme would also have to operate across a country already dealing with an ageing population and persistent labour shortages.
Manufacturing, construction, agriculture and social care all rely heavily on migrant workers in parts of Italy. Removing a population of the size Vannacci cites could therefore affect the labour market as well as migration policy. It would be a demographic and economic intervention, not a short-term enforcement measure.
That does not mean every tougher immigration policy would be unlawful or impossible. It does mean there is a considerable gap between a political demand and a programme that could be administered within Italy’s constitutional and European legal framework.
Green Deal opposition carries an industrial price
Vannacci’s third condition targets the European Green Deal, the EU framework covering emissions, energy, transport and industrial transition. He argues that its requirements damage Italian industry and undermine national competitiveness.
A unilateral Italian withdrawal would be complicated because many of the framework’s measures are already embedded in European law. Italy is also part of the EU single market, where companies operate under common standards. Abandoning those rules would not automatically free Italian exporters from them; it could instead create additional compliance problems for firms selling across borders.
The financial consequences could be significant. European subsidies and investment are intended to modernise production, improve energy efficiency and reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels. A retreat from the Green Deal could put some of that support at risk or require difficult renegotiation. Slower investment in alternatives could also leave Italy more exposed to swings in fossil-fuel prices.
There is room for Meloni to criticise individual Green Deal measures while responding to businesses worried about the cost of the transition. Accepting Vannacci’s demand for a complete break would be a different matter. It could trigger conflict with EU institutions and partners while creating uncertainty for industries that depend on common European rules and funding.
Power from outside the cabinet
Vannacci’s proposed role may be as consequential as his three policies. A minister must defend budgets, administer programmes and answer for failure. An external supporter can press for decisions, claim credit when they succeed and distance themselves from unpopular results.
That arrangement could make a future majority unstable even if it helped Meloni form a government. National Future might demand concessions on Ukraine, migration or climate policy without sharing full cabinet responsibility for putting them into effect. Meloni would then have to manage both her formal coalition and a pressure centre operating beyond it.
A 7 per cent vote share would not give Vannacci unlimited power. Its importance would depend on the number of seats won by the larger parties and on whether Meloni could govern without him. In a closely divided parliament, however, a relatively small party can become decisive on confidence votes, budgets and major legislation.
The central question is therefore not simply whether Meloni accepts or rejects three sweeping demands. It is whether she would trade control over part of her government’s foreign, migration and economic agenda for the parliamentary support needed to govern.
Vannacci is attempting to turn electoral weight into strategic control while preserving his independence. If the calculation succeeds, Italy’s next right-wing government could inherit a majority on paper but a permanent source of pressure outside the cabinet.