A report has identified a network of four companies linked to István Tiborcz, Viktor Orbán’s son-in-law, which allegedly channelled about 125bn forints through a preferential-dividend arrangement. The case has renewed scrutiny of how politically connected businesses benefited from state-linked contracts and access to public resources during the former government’s years in power.
Hungarian media reported on 4 August 2026 that companies surrounding Mr Tiborcz used four largely inactive joint-stock companies – Fagales Zrt., EUB-RESZ Zrt., DDL Invest Zrt. and Completus Service Zrt. – to distribute substantial profits. The HVG report said almost 52bn forints passed through Fagales, while a further 73bn forints was identified in the other three intermediary companies.
The reported mechanism relied on preferential shares, under which a minority shareholder could receive as much as 99.9% of a company’s profits according to the rights attached to its status. In practice, that arrangement allowed money to be directed towards selected beneficiaries while the companies themselves appeared to serve primarily as conduits rather than as substantial operating businesses.
How the money was channelled
The four firms are described in the report as “empty” or shell-like companies. Their significance lies less in visible commercial activity than in the flow of dividends through their ownership structures. By using different share categories and preferential rights, the arrangement could allocate the overwhelming majority of profits to a minority investor, creating a legal and corporate route for concentrating returns.
The figures indicate the scale of the operation. Nearly 52bn forints was associated with Fagales alone, while the three remaining companies accounted for about 73bn more. Taken together, the reported flows amount to approximately 125bn forints over several years. These are not presented as a single payment or one isolated transaction, but as the combined value identified across the four companies.
One of the largest contributors to the flows was named as Attila Balas, a businessman known in Hungary as the “king of paving stones and gravel”. The report’s reference to Mr Balas links the dividend arrangements to a wider circle of companies and individuals who prospered around politically connected business networks.
State contracts and public money
The political importance of the case comes from the reported relationship between such businesses and the state. A significant share of the profits associated with these networks was generated around companies that received public contracts or had access to budgetary resources. That raises a direct question about whether money originating with Hungarian taxpayers was converted into private wealth for a narrow group close to the former prime minister.
The issue is particularly sensitive because the reported arrangements emerged against a background of worsening economic conditions and falling purchasing power for ordinary Hungarians. While households faced a deterioration in their ability to buy goods and services, the previous government was accused of creating favourable conditions for the accumulation of capital among its political allies.
That contrast is central to the significance of the allegations. The concern is not simply that wealthy individuals received large dividends, but that public decisions and state-backed opportunities helped create the profits later distributed through opaque corporate structures. If public contracts or budget access were essential to the income behind the payments, the arrangements would represent more than aggressive financial engineering: they would illustrate how state resources could be redirected towards a politically privileged business environment.
Pressure on the new government
The report also places the case within the new government’s effort to challenge the financial legacy of the former administration. Péter Magyar’s government is seeking 300bn forints from Mr Balas over an office-district project in Zugló, a district of the Hungarian capital. The demand gives the suspected dividend flows an immediate political dimension, connecting the companies under scrutiny to a much larger dispute over assets, contracts and accountability.
The reported use of intermediary companies and preferential shares will make the money trail difficult for the public to assess. It also leaves a broader unresolved issue: whether the transactions were merely structured to exploit corporate rules, or whether they formed part of a deliberate system for transferring the proceeds of state-enabled business towards the former prime minister’s inner circle.
Should Hungary’s new government prioritise recovering the money, or focus first on establishing how state contracts enabled the profits to be generated?
