Poland plans to spend more than 102 billion zlotys — nearly €23 billion — on civil defence between 2027 and 2031. The proposed programme would fund shelters, rescue equipment, warning systems, protected communications, water and energy reserves, and cybersecurity.
Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced the planned investment at a government meeting on 6 October 2026, linking it directly to Russia’s war against Ukraine and the risks facing Poland’s eastern border. The money is not yet spent; it is a five-year government plan that would give civilian protection a much larger role in the country’s security policy.
Polsat News reported Tusk’s remarks during the cabinet session. His warning was not that a wider war is certain, but that modern conflict can damage the systems on which civilian life depends long before — or without — fighting reaching every town.
The infrastructure behind an emergency response
Shelters are the most obvious part of the proposal. They would provide protection for residents during attacks or serious damage to buildings and urban infrastructure. But the wider list of spending priorities suggests that Warsaw is planning for more than the first few hours of a crisis.
Rescue equipment would allow emergency crews to work amid damaged buildings, blocked roads and disrupted transport. Warning systems would help authorities send instructions to the public. Protected communications would give officials and rescue services a way to coordinate if ordinary networks became overloaded, compromised or unavailable.
That distinction matters in a large-scale emergency. A shelter can protect people from immediate danger, but it cannot by itself organise evacuations, identify where supplies are needed or keep hospitals operating. Those tasks require functioning communications, trained responders and reliable links between national institutions, municipalities and emergency services.
The planned reserves of water and energy address the same problem from another direction. If electricity networks, pipelines or supply routes were interrupted, stored resources could give authorities time to restore them. Hospitals, public institutions and households would all depend on that margin. Civil defence is therefore being treated not simply as a matter of protection from explosions or debris, but as a way to preserve basic services when normal systems fail.
Cybersecurity is included for similar reasons. A serious disruption could begin with an attack or failure affecting public administration, communications or critical infrastructure rather than with physical damage to a city. If digital systems go down, authorities may struggle to warn residents, coordinate rescue work or distribute essential supplies.
A change in what national security means
The scale of the proposed spending marks a shift in emphasis. Civil defence has traditionally attracted less attention and money than military capability. Tusk’s presentation places it alongside the wider national effort to prepare for long-term security risks.
The reference to the war in Ukraine puts the plan in a clear regional context. Poland sees the conflict not only as a war being fought in a neighbouring country, but as a test of how states protect their populations, infrastructure and institutions under sustained pressure. The government is preparing for scenarios in which a military crisis affects civilian communities, transport, energy supplies or communications.
That is a risk assessment, not proof that a broader conflict is imminent. Nor does the announcement establish that every element of the programme will be delivered on schedule. It does, however, show that Warsaw considers civilian disruption a serious part of its security planning rather than a secondary consequence to be dealt with after military preparations are complete.
The logic is straightforward. Armed forces cannot operate in isolation from the rest of the country. They rely on roads, power, telecommunications, public administration and supply networks. If those systems are fragile, a state’s ability to respond to a crisis is weakened even when its military units remain intact.
The NATO dimension
Poland’s approach also reflects a wider concern for resilience within NATO. An alliance’s military strength depends partly on whether member states can keep ports, roads, energy systems and communications functioning during an emergency. Civilian infrastructure helps protect residents, but it can also support the movement of personnel and equipment and the coordination of allied activity.
That does not turn every shelter or water reserve into a military asset. The immediate purpose of the proposed investment is civilian: keeping people safe and essential services working. But the same capacity can help an allied state withstand pressure for longer, reducing the chance that disruption to public systems will paralyse its national response.
The practical challenge now lies in delivery. The government will need to decide how the planned 102 billion zlotys are divided between national bodies and local authorities, which shelters can actually be used, and how quickly warning networks, reserves and protected communications become operational.
Poland has put a price on a problem that is often less visible than tanks or aircraft: the ability of ordinary life to continue during a severe crisis. The measure of the programme will not be the size of the announcement, but whether residents can find protection, receive reliable instructions and obtain basic supplies when the systems they normally take for granted stop working.
