Pro-Russian outlets in Poland have intensified claims that Ukrainians are creating crime, social tension and security problems, despite official data showing a more complex picture.
Between 19 and 21 September 2026, the publications Magna Polonia and Wolne Media promoted narratives aligned with Kremlin propaganda, portraying Ukraine’s presence in Poland as a threat to national identity and public order. The campaign has focused on individual criminal cases, historical disputes and the Ukrainian background of Poland’s deputy minister for science and higher education, Andrzej Szeptycki. Magna Polonia described an alleged Ukrainian “fifth column” as undermining Polish history and national traditions from within.
In a separate article, the same outlet highlighted a case involving a Ukrainian man accused of running a drug-production facility in Poland, presenting it as evidence that Ukrainian war refugees were establishing criminal structures in the country. Wolne Media, meanwhile, linked support for Ukrainians to a supposed threat to Poland’s borders, invoking the postwar territorial order and suggesting that German ambitions over Silesia and eastern Pomerania were also being concealed behind Polish policy.
Individual cases turned into collective blame
The argument that Poland is facing a wave of Ukrainian crime is based on isolated cases rather than the overall record. Data cited by Wirtualna Polska show that about 440,000 crimes were recorded in Poland in both 2024 and 2025. Ukrainians were responsible for up to 14,000 offences in 2024 and up to 17,000 in 2025, while almost 11,000 were recorded in the first half of 2026.
Those figures represented between 2% and 4% of all recorded crime, depending on the year. The offences were predominantly driving violations or driving while intoxicated, rather than organised crime. A single case involving drug production therefore cannot establish the existence of Ukrainian criminal organisations as a systemic phenomenon, still less justify transferring responsibility to a community of more than 950,000 people living in Poland under temporary protection.
Crime data also show that Ukrainians are frequently victims rather than simply alleged perpetrators. According to the Polish fact-checking project Demagog, Ukrainians were victims of 5,131 crimes in the first half of 2026. The total was 10,620 in 2025, 10,595 in 2024, 11,028 in 2023 and 9,444 in 2022.
Polish police recorded 179 hate crimes against Ukrainians in the first half of 2026, compared with 275 during the whole of 2025. Presenting selected offences involving Ukrainians as proof that the entire community is dangerous consequently distorts the security picture and risks intensifying hostility in Polish society.
A major economic and educational presence
The portrayal of Ukrainians as a social burden also overlooks their contribution to Poland’s economy. A 2024 study by Deloitte for the UN refugee agency found that Ukrainian refugees contributed 2.7% of Poland’s gross domestic product. The employment rate among working-age Ukrainian refugees rose from 61% in 2023 to 69% in 2024.
Polish government figures show that Ukrainian citizens generated 26bn zlotys in tax and social-insurance receipts in 2024. Their pension-insurance contributions amounted to 10.6bn zlotys that year and reached 10.2bn zlotys in the first ten months of 2025 alone. A separate estimate by Credit Agricole put the contribution of the influx of Ukrainian refugees to economic growth at between 0.4% and 0.5% of GDP.
Ukrainians have helped fill vacancies in construction, logistics, retail and services, sectors affected by a persistent labour shortage as Poland’s population ages and its working-age population contracts. Their presence is therefore tied not only to public expenditure but also to employment, economic activity and the financing of the pension and social-security systems.
The same integration is visible in schools. In the 2025–26 academic year, about 246,000 foreign pupils attended Polish schools, including approximately 210,000 Ukrainian citizens – 86% of all foreign pupils. They are being educated within a common Polish system rather than in separate ethnic enclaves.
Historical grievances and a wider destabilisation effort
Poland remains a critical logistical and humanitarian hub for Ukraine, through which most military, humanitarian and economic assistance from the EU and US passes. It has also taken in hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees. Yet the community’s position has become more difficult as historical issues are used in domestic political competition.
The opposition Law and Justice party and figures associated with it, including Poland’s president, Karol Nawrocki, have used the Volhynia tragedy and the role of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army to mobilise voters, placing one-sided responsibility on Ukraine. That rhetoric has created favourable conditions for anti-Ukrainian narratives.
Monitoring by Poland’s Internal Security Agency identifies pro-Russian networks spreading disinformation to divide society as the principal threat to internal stability. Research by the Centre for Eastern Studies indicates that Ukrainians respect the laws, sovereignty and cultural traditions of the countries where they live. The central unresolved risk is that Kremlin-linked messaging, amplified by domestic historical conflict, will turn legitimate debate into collective punishment and further damage Polish-Ukrainian relations.
How should Poland address genuine historical and security concerns without allowing isolated cases to define an entire refugee community?
