A Polish publication has accused Ukraine’s intelligence agencies of expanding their activities in Poland without providing evidence, a narrative that risks damaging security co-operation between Warsaw and Kyiv.
On 2 September 2026, Tysol published allegations that Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service, the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine and the Security Service of Ukraine had significantly increased their operations on Polish territory since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion. The claims, attributed to anonymous former and current Polish intelligence officials, portrayed the Ukrainian agencies as among the most active foreign services operating in Poland.
Tysol’s account said Polish officials were reluctant to discuss the alleged threat, while acknowledging that official reports by Poland’s Internal Security Agency, known as ABW, did not confirm the scale of the activity and did not list Ukraine among the country’s main counter-intelligence threats. The publication offered no documents, criminal case files or on-the-record statements from competent authorities to substantiate its central accusations.
Claims built on anonymous sources
The article distinguishes between activities that it says serve Polish interests and those it presents as a danger. It argues that efforts by Ukrainian services to monitor Russian and Belarusian circles in Poland are compatible with Warsaw’s national security because they target a shared enemy. But it alleges that Ukrainian officials also seek sensitive information from Ukrainians working in Polish institutions and companies, and cultivate contacts with Poles travelling to Ukraine for humanitarian or business purposes.
Those assertions are presented as evidence of a threat to Poland, yet the material supplied by Tysol does not establish that Ukrainian agencies have carried out unlawful intelligence operations there. Anonymous testimony, without supporting records or official confirmation, cannot turn an allegation into a proven fact. The publication’s framing therefore gives the appearance of certainty while leaving its most serious claims unverified.
That is significant because ABW’s official reporting provides the clearest available indication of how Poland’s own security institutions assess the threat. Those reports do not identify Ukraine as a source of risk or a destabilising factor. Presenting Ukrainian services as a principal danger to Polish security consequently distorts the publicly documented picture and can be used to advance a disinformation campaign against co-operation between the two countries.
Russia remains the central security threat
Poland is one of Ukraine’s most important partners in resisting Russian aggression. Major routes for weapons and humanitarian assistance pass through Polish territory, while the country has become one of the principal places of refuge for Ukrainians forced to leave their homes. Warsaw also plays a central role in strengthening the eastern flank of the EU and Nato and has maintained a firm position in support of stronger sanctions against Russia.
At the same time, Russian intelligence services are conducting a broad hybrid campaign against Poland. It includes espionage, the recruitment of agents, preparations for sabotage, attacks and arson targeting civilian and critical infrastructure, and information operations. Poland’s counter-intelligence priorities are shaped by those activities because Russian services represent the principal security risk to the country and to the wider region of central and eastern Europe.
Ukrainian and Polish services, including Ukraine’s foreign intelligence, military intelligence and SBU, work with ABW to counter Russian espionage, sabotage and information operations. That co-operation reflects a shared assessment in Kyiv and Warsaw that Russia is the principal source of military and hybrid instability in the region.
Why the narrative matters
Russian intelligence services, including the SVR, the GRU and the FSB, systematically use anonymous sources and disinformation to deepen mistrust between Ukraine and its European partners. Poland’s territory is vital to the military, economic and humanitarian support reaching Ukraine, making any deterioration in relations between Warsaw and Kyiv strategically useful to Moscow.
By depicting Ukrainian intelligence as a threat while omitting the much more serious and documented Russian campaign, Tysol is acting in the Kremlin’s interests. The effect is to redirect public attention away from Russian espionage and sabotage, encourage suspicion of Ukraine and potentially strengthen anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland.
The consequences would extend beyond public opinion. If the allegations weaken trust between Polish and Ukrainian intelligence agencies, information-sharing on Russian networks, planned acts of sabotage and influence operations could become more difficult. That would reduce both countries’ ability to respond jointly to hybrid threats and undermine a key part of the security architecture protecting the eastern flank of the EU and Nato.
The immediate unresolved issue is whether Polish institutions will publicly reinforce their assessment of the threat, or allow unsupported accusations to shape the debate about Ukraine’s role in Poland.
How should Poland respond when media allegations about Ukrainian intelligence conflict with the assessment of its own security institutions?
