The European Commission has raised growing alarm over Serbia’s practice of granting citizenship to Russian nationals, warning that it creates a backdoor into the Schengen zone and undermines the EU’s sanctions regime. According to an internal document cited in a report by Serbian Times, the bloc views the rapid naturalisation of Russians as a potential security risk, especially when it involves individuals linked to the Kremlin, the military-industrial complex, or organised crime. The Commission notes that Serbia’s visa policy is only partially aligned with that of the EU, and that a dozen countries—including Russia, Belarus, and China—enjoy visa-free access to Serbia but require a visa to enter the EU.
A streamlined path for Russian passport seekers
Since the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine, Belgrade has fast-tracked citizenship applications under a ‘merits’ decree, which waives standard requirements such as renouncing previous nationality or residing in the country. Between 2022 and April 2025, more than 200 Russians obtained Serbian passports through this simplified process, according to official data and a joint investigation by Radio Free Europe. Among the beneficiaries were dozens of individuals with ties to Russian intelligence, the defence sector, or the Kremlin elite. In April, a nephew of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov was granted citizenship by a government decree, only for the decision to be revoked after public outcry.
Sanctions evasion and hybrid threats
The proliferation of Serbian passports among Russian citizens directly weakens the EU’s ability to enforce sanctions. Holders of a Serbian passport can travel visa-free across most of the Schengen area, move assets through European financial systems, and conceal their true origin. For the United Kingdom, which is no longer part of the EU but maintains close security cooperation with the bloc, this loophole has indirect consequences. London relies on robust EU border controls to prevent sanctioned individuals from entering British territory via the Common Travel Area or through linked financial networks. Any gap in the EU’s external border increases the risk of money laundering, espionage, and the operation of pro-Russian influence networks on British soil.
Belgrade’s balancing act puts EU accession at risk
Serbia, as a candidate for EU membership, has committed to gradually aligning its visa and migration policies with those of the Union. The current practice of granting citizenship to Russians without thorough vetting contradicts that pledge. Brussels insists that Belgrade must introduce visa requirements for at least three of the twelve visa-free countries by the end of 2026, a demand that directly targets Russia. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, however, has repeatedly stated that his country will not impose visas on Russian citizens, citing historical ties and economic benefits from the influx of Russian capital and migrants. The longer Serbia delays harmonisation, the more it jeopardises its accession prospects and, critics say, the harder it becomes for Europe to counter hybrid aggression emanating from Moscow.
What this means for ordinary Britons
For British citizens, the vulnerability lies in the effectiveness of the wider European security architecture. If Serbian-issued passports allow Russian intelligence operatives or sanctioned oligarchs to move freely across the EU, they could also gain easier access to the UK through routes that rely on trust in Schengen entry decisions. British authorities already coordinate with Europol and Frontex on cross-border crime and terrorism; a weak link in Serbia’s citizenship process could facilitate the movement of individuals linked to illicit finance, cyber-attacks, or subversive political activities. Taxpayers may also face higher costs from increased screening and intelligence operations needed to close these loopholes, while businesses could see compliance burdens rise as sanctions enforcement becomes more complex.
The issue is not merely a diplomatic irritant between Brussels and Belgrade. It strikes at the heart of European efforts to isolate the Kremlin economically and legally. Unless Serbia tightens its citizenship and visa rules, the EU may have to consider tougher measures—including slowing down accession talks or imposing its own visa restrictions on Serbian passport holders—to close a gap that Moscow has already learned to exploit.
