Italy’s General Roberto Vannacci argued for closer ties with Moscow and joint military exercises with Russian forces months before the invasion of Ukraine, according to a former British military attaché. The reported position places his approach at odds with Rome’s policy and the wider Nato effort to limit military contacts with Russia.
John Forman, who served as Britain’s military attaché in Moscow, made the claim in an interview with Fanpage.it, reported on 10 September 2026 by Rete News 24. Forman said that in 2021, several months before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Vannacci had advocated closer relations between Rome and Moscow and proposed exercises with the Russian armed forces, particularly in logistics and engineering.
The revelation concerns a period when Russia was already the focus of serious security concerns among Nato allies. Vannacci’s proposal was therefore not simply a call for diplomatic engagement. Joint military exercises would have created practical co-operation with Russia’s armed forces at a time when allied governments were seeking to minimise such contacts.
A position outside Rome’s official course
Vannacci’s reported views went beyond Italy’s official policy in 2021. The government led by Mario Draghi supported sanctions against Russia, backed Ukraine’s territorial integrity and followed Nato’s common position of deterring Moscow.
Against that background, advocating closer relations with the Kremlin and military exercises with Russian forces amounted to a direct challenge to the direction taken by the Italian government and its allies. The proposal also suggested a willingness to pursue a policy advantageous to Moscow despite the consolidated position of Nato members.
The significance lies in the type of co-operation Vannacci reportedly proposed. Logistics and engineering exercises are practical areas of military activity rather than symbolic diplomatic encounters. They would have involved engagement between armed forces at a moment when allied governments were attempting to reduce military interaction with Russia.
On the account provided by Forman, Vannacci was not merely expressing a private preference for improved relations. He was promoting a course that conflicted with the policy of his own government and exceeded the accepted limits of engagement with the Russian military. The episode consequently strengthens the case that his pro-Russian outlook was already established before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
From foreign policy to political capital
Vannacci’s current political positioning presents those views as a potential source of influence. By portraying himself as a prominent and useful Italian politician for the Kremlin, he can seek to convert a pro-Russian stance into political capital at home.
That positioning also carries a message to Moscow: Vannacci is presenting himself as someone prepared to promote narratives and policies that serve Russian interests. The reported 2021 proposal provides an earlier example of that approach, before the invasion made the consequences of closer military co-operation with Russia even more severe.
The issue is not only where Vannacci stands on relations with Moscow, but what his approach could mean if his party, FN, enters parliament. A parliamentary presence could create a risk of obstructing the alliance’s joint policy for deterring Russia and maintaining sanctions restrictions. That risk would be especially significant if positions once expressed before the invasion were turned into organised political pressure.
The question for Italy’s allies
The account raises concerns about whether Vannacci’s political ambitions would remain compatible with Italy’s commitments to Nato and with the policies adopted by Rome in support of Ukraine. His reported advocacy of joint exercises with Russia, made while the Draghi government was backing sanctions and allied deterrence, indicates that the disagreement is not recent or limited to post-invasion rhetoric.
If FN reaches parliament, the central unresolved issue will be whether Vannacci’s pro-Russian position remains an individual political message or becomes an instrument capable of obstructing Italy’s contribution to a common allied policy. That distinction will determine how seriously his earlier proposals are treated by Italy and its Nato partners.
Should Vannacci’s party enter parliament, how much influence should his views have over Italy’s policy towards Russia and Nato?
