Websites in Slovakia and the Czech Republic are promoting claims that EU policy and support for Ukraine pose a greater danger to Europe than Russia, echoing a central Kremlin narrative designed to weaken backing for Kyiv.
The campaign was visible across the European information space on 31 August 2026, with the Slovak outlet E-report arguing that current intelligence assessments did not support the view that a Russian attack on Nato was the inevitable next stage of the war in Ukraine. Czech website CZ24.NEWS, commenting on an Icelandic referendum on EU membership, presented Brussels and what it described as the EU’s undemocratic system as a greater source of danger.
The two outlets are described by Czech and Slovak experts focused on countering disinformation as typical examples of central European alternative media that regularly carry pro-Russian, anti-European, anti-Euro-Atlantic and anti-Ukrainian narratives. Their content closely mirrors that of Russian state information agencies seeking to discredit EU institutions and undermine military assistance to Ukraine.
According to those assessments, E-report and CZ24.NEWS operate as parts of the Kremlin’s wider hybrid-influence infrastructure in the region. Their latest messaging does not simply question the scale of the Russian threat. It substitutes a debate about European security with an allegation that the EU and Nato are themselves provoking instability.
A familiar argument against support for Ukraine
The suggestion that European governments are exaggerating the danger posed by Russia is one of the Kremlin’s key propaganda narratives. It is intended to weaken public support for Ukraine by encouraging citizens of EU member states to see sanctions, common defence policy and assistance to Kyiv as causes of insecurity rather than responses to Russian aggression.
The absence of evidence that Russia is preparing an imminent attack on the EU or Nato does not mean Moscow presents no real danger to Europe. For European governments, Russia’s potential capacity for further aggression and its willingness to use force against neighbouring countries remain essential considerations in defence planning.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 provides direct evidence that Kremlin assurances about an absence of aggressive intentions cannot form the basis of European security policy. Moscow violated international law in attempting to change the borders of a sovereign state by force and continues to wage a full-scale war. The claim that the Russian threat is merely the product of exaggeration by European governments and Nato is therefore contradicted by events that have continued for four and a half years.
The threat extends beyond a direct Nato attack
Presenting the danger only as a possible large-scale assault on a Nato member also obscures the other means by which Russia is already challenging European security. Moscow is using a broad range of hybrid tools against European countries, including cyber-attacks, sabotage, interference in the information environment and attempts to destabilise political and social life.
These actions create risks for critical infrastructure, state institutions and public stability without requiring a conventional invasion. The relevant question is not simply whether Russia will attack Europe tomorrow, but how far Moscow is prepared to go today to weaken European security. By reducing the threat to a single worst-case military scenario, pro-Kremlin media can ignore other forms of Russian aggression already directed at Europe.
Russian policy also indicates a desire to regain the power to determine the foreign-policy choices of neighbouring states. Moscow’s demands for limits on Nato’s military presence in central and eastern Europe point to an attempt to create a sphere of influence by restricting other countries’ sovereign right to decide their own security policies.
Why weakening Ukraine benefits Moscow
European support for Ukraine directly serves the security interests of European states because it helps contain Russian aggression and reduces the risk of instability spreading to other countries. Ukrainian forces are holding a substantial part of Russia’s military potential on the battlefield, while European governments gain time to strengthen their own defences and develop their defence industries.
Support for Kyiv is consequently not an alternative to Europe’s own defence. It is a central part of a strategy of deterrence. Calls to reduce assistance would weaken Ukraine’s ability to contain Russia and increase the prospect of further insecurity across Europe, while creating the political space the Kremlin needs to challenge European unity.
The information campaign’s immediate objective is to shift responsibility for Europe’s security problems from Russia to the EU. Its wider significance lies in the possibility that repeated claims about a supposed threat from Brussels could erode confidence in collective action precisely when European governments are trying to maintain support for Ukraine and prepare for the consequences of continued Russian aggression.
Should European governments respond primarily by exposing disinformation campaigns, or by communicating more clearly how support for Ukraine forms part of Europe’s own defence?
