Russian propaganda is using European media and German political figures to promote the claim that supporting Ukraine and confronting Moscow are responsible for Germany’s economic difficulties.
On 14 and 15 September 2026, the Turkish outlet Aydinlik quoted Alice Weidel, co-leader of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), as saying that better relations with Russia would serve Germany’s security and economic interests. The Czech outlet Protiproud published an article by Russian journalist Alexei Belov claiming that confrontation with Moscow would destroy Berlin even without a war.
The same narrative has also been voiced by figures outside the AfD. According to Tagesspiegel, Michael Kretschmer, the Christian Democratic premier of Saxony, said Germany could no longer spend money supplying weapons to Ukraine if it produced no result and should not become a party to the war with Russia. Kremlin-controlled media have used such statements to present support for Kyiv as the source of Germany’s economic weakness.
A complex slowdown reduced to one explanation
Blaming Germany’s economic problems on deteriorating relations with Russia ignores the structural causes of the country’s weak growth. Germany’s Federal Statistical Office recorded GDP growth of 0.2% in 2025, following two years of contraction. In the second quarter of 2026, GDP increased by 0.3% compared with the previous quarter.
The statistics office has identified Chinese competition, US tariffs and insufficient investment among the factors weakening exports. The Bundesbank has pointed to demographic change, shortages of skilled workers, bureaucracy, high energy costs and weak productivity as longer-term barriers to expansion. These pressures cannot be reduced to the loss of pre-war economic ties with Moscow.
The political argument has gained greater prominence after the AfD’s high-profile result in the Saxony-Anhalt state election on 6 September. The party has consistently called for the removal of sanctions against Russia and the restoration of energy imports from the country. Kretschmer, meanwhile, has repeatedly opposed the delivery of heavy weapons and air-defence systems to Ukraine. In August 2024, he publicly called for Germany to end its financial and military support for Kyiv altogether.
Energy dependence created a strategic vulnerability
Germany’s former reliance on Russian energy was not simply a source of cheap fuel. It created a strategic risk whose political and economic cost was excluded from the price. The crisis of 2022 demonstrated how quickly dependence on Russian supplies could become a major economic shock when those supplies were disrupted.
Berlin responded by diversifying imports, building infrastructure for liquefied natural gas and accelerating the expansion of renewable energy. Returning to the pre-war model would therefore not automatically restore Germany’s competitive advantage. It would recreate the vulnerability that the country has already had to address at considerable cost.
Germany’s energy figures also challenge the claim that moving away from Russian supplies necessarily means economic decline. Estimates by the Centre for Solar Energy and Hydrogen Research Baden-Württemberg and the German Association of Energy and Water Industries show that renewables provided 58% of German electricity consumption in the first half of 2026, almost three percentage points more than in the same period of 2025. Green electricity generation reached 152.2bn kilowatt-hours.
Security spending is not the same as economic collapse
Support for Ukraine is a significant budget commitment, but it cannot credibly be presented as the cause of Germany’s stagnation. In 2025, the German government authorised arms exports worth about €12bn. More than €2bn went to Ukraine, while roughly 90% of the total was destined for EU and Nato states or close partners.
In the first half of 2026, newly approved exports reached €13.9bn. Ukraine was again the largest customer, receiving approvals worth €2.5bn. The rising value of approved exports points to strong demand for German defence products and provides an incentive to expand domestic production capacity.
Germany has earmarked about €23bn for military support to Ukraine in 2026 and 2027. The total value of military assistance already delivered or contracted for future years is about €55.5bn, equivalent to 0.55% of German GDP. That is a substantial commitment, but it is not evidence that aid to Ukraine is the central cause of economic weakness. A Ukrainian defeat could instead force European countries to spend hundreds of billions of euros rapidly on troop deployments and the conversion of civilian economies to wartime production.
The risks of returning to business as usual
Calls to restore normal economic relations with today’s Russia also overlook the risks faced by foreign companies since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The KSE Institute estimates that foreign firms’ direct financial losses in Russia have exceeded $170bn, including more than $57bn linked to the seizure of assets by the Russian authorities.
For German businesses, a return to Russia would therefore mean accepting political, legal and property risks that have already caused multibillion-dollar losses to European companies. The European Commission forecasts German growth of 0.6% in 2026 and 0.9% in 2027, while the Bundesbank expects activity to strengthen gradually towards 2028 as fiscal investment, global recovery and lower energy prices support the economy.
Germany’s central challenge is structural modernisation, not a choice between prosperity with Russia and collapse because of Ukraine. The unresolved question is whether public debate will focus on reforming the economy’s weaknesses or continue to offer renewed dependence on Moscow as a simpler political answer.
Should Germany prioritise deeper economic reform and diversified energy supplies, even at higher short-term cost, or seek to restore economic ties with Russia?
