Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) is seeking to insert itself into diplomacy over the war in Ukraine with a proposed summit that would leave Ukraine outside the room. The party says it wants Germany, the United States and Russia to meet in Abu Dhabi in spring 2027, while using the gathering to discuss not only the war but also sanctions, energy ties and Nord Stream.
The meeting is still a proposal rather than an established diplomatic process. Moscow says it expects to take part, but Washington has made no commitment, and the AfD has no mandate to negotiate for the German government or the European Union. Even so, the plan exposes a growing argument over who gets to shape Europe’s security and whether relations with Moscow should be restored before the war has ended.
A summit without Kyiv
Reports published on 8 November 2026 said the AfD was seeking to organise a three-way meeting in Abu Dhabi in the second quarter of 2027. Party representatives have described themselves as potential intermediaries and said they maintain contacts with the US State Department and advisers to President Donald Trump. They also claim to have contacts with Russia’s Foreign Ministry, the presidential administration and relevant security services.
Those claims come from AfD representatives and do not establish that the party has been given an official negotiating role. The proposed format was reported by Le Monde; a separate account was circulated by Briefly.
Kirill Dmitriev, head of Russia’s sovereign investment fund, said in Istanbul on 22 October that Moscow had already confirmed its participation in some form. “In December 2026, we will already have a meeting with representatives of the AfD,” he said, referring to a forum expected to take place “approximately in the second quarter of 2027”.
Markus Frohnmaier, a deputy leader of the AfD parliamentary group in the Bundestag and a member of its Foreign Affairs Committee, said Dmitriev was coordinating preparations with the American side. Frohnmaier said the proposed summit could cover economic and energy cooperation with Russia, including the possible restoration of the Nord Stream gas pipelines.
The most important participant remains uncertain. No US agreement to attend has been confirmed, while there is no indication that the German government has authorised the AfD to represent Germany. At this stage, the plan is a party initiative backed by statements from Moscow, not a confirmed meeting between the three governments.
Its most consequential feature would be the exclusion of Ukraine. A gathering about ending the war and shaping European security would involve other states while leaving out the country directly subjected to Russia’s military aggression. Even without producing a formal agreement, such an arrangement could reinforce the idea that major powers may decide questions about another country’s territory and security without its participation.
Berlin on a separate track
The AfD’s proposal would position Germany as an independent actor between Washington and Moscow rather than as part of a jointly agreed European process. That distinction matters because any discussion of sanctions, security guarantees or the terms of a settlement would affect every EU member state.
A separate German channel would not automatically split the Union. It could, however, create a competing diplomatic initiative alongside the EU’s formal mechanisms and make it harder for member states to maintain a common position. Governments could face pressure to choose between an American-led process, an agreed European line and a Germany-Russia route promoted by a party outside the federal government.
The AfD’s domestic strength gives the proposal a reach beyond a marginal foreign-policy intervention. It is leading national opinion polls cited in the reporting, with support of about 27% to 29%, ahead of Germany’s main established parties. The party does not govern Germany and cannot speak for Berlin or Brussels, but its electoral position makes its foreign-policy agenda harder to dismiss.
Its approach to Russia is consistent. The AfD supports restoring economic and energy relations with Moscow, lifting sanctions and returning Russia to international cooperation formats such as the Group of Seven. It also calls for an immediate end to military and financial assistance to Ukraine, presenting that support as leverage to force Kyiv into negotiations with Moscow.
The settlement envisaged by the party would not aim to restore Ukraine’s internationally recognised 1991 borders, according to the position described in the reporting. A summit built around that approach would therefore concern more than a ceasefire. It could become a forum for discussing a wider political and economic reset with Moscow before the underlying security issues of the war had been resolved.
Nord Stream brings energy into the bargain
The reference to Nord Stream gives the proposal a practical economic dimension. The AfD has suggested transferring control of the pipelines to a joint German-American company. Changing the ownership or management structure would not, by itself, remove the strategic question of dependence on Russian gas.
Germany and other European states have worked to reduce their exposure to Russian energy since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. A return to pipeline cooperation would therefore involve more than prices, infrastructure or corporate control. It would reopen the broader question of whether Europe should continue diversifying its energy supplies or restore a close relationship with Moscow.
Russia’s past use of energy supplies as a source of political pressure makes that question particularly sensitive. Restarting gas cooperation before the security risks associated with the war were addressed could recreate vulnerabilities that European governments have tried to reduce. The involvement of German and American companies would not automatically remove the risk created by reliance on a Russian supplier.
Sanctions are tied to the same debate. If ending the war and restoring economic relations were treated as parts of a single bargain, negotiations could become a route towards easing restrictions without a durable change in Russian policy. In that scenario, Moscow could regain access to European markets and financial resources without making equivalent concessions.
That is a possible consequence, not a settled outcome. The AfD cannot lift EU sanctions on its own or reopen Nord Stream. Such decisions would require national governments and European institutions to resolve legal, technical and security questions. But placing sanctions and energy cooperation on the agenda can still shift the political debate: from whether a return to previous relations is justified to how quickly it might begin.
A wider argument over Europe’s security
The AfD initiative comes as Washington discusses a possible new architecture for European security. Jared Kushner, described in the reporting as a special representative of the US president, said in early November that the proposed system could include permanent consultations, crisis-communication mechanisms, greater military transparency and measures to reduce the risk of escalation involving European countries and Russia.
Kushner said the framework would supplement existing security arrangements and create conditions for long-term stability. In several European capitals and among NATO representatives, there are concerns that allowing Moscow to help shape such an architecture could give Russia new opportunities to expand its influence and entrench arrangements favourable to the Kremlin, potentially at the expense of Ukraine and the European Union.
There is no established link between the American security discussion and the summit promoted by the AfD. The two debates nevertheless touch the same strategic question: should Russia participate in defining Europe’s future security arrangements, and under what conditions? The AfD route is distinguished by its separate national format, the absence of an EU mandate and the exclusion of Ukraine.
For Moscow, the political signal could matter even if the summit never takes place. A prominent European party advocating renewed economic and political ties during an ongoing war may strengthen the expectation that elections and changes of government will gradually weaken support for Kyiv. That expectation could reduce the Kremlin’s incentive to make concessions and encourage it to wait for more favourable political circumstances in Europe.
The immediate questions are therefore practical as well as political: will the Abu Dhabi meeting happen, will Washington join it, and can the AfD turn a party proposal into a recognised diplomatic channel? Until those questions are answered, the plan remains an attempt to influence Europe’s debate. If it gains official standing, it could become a test of whether separate national diplomacy adds flexibility to negotiations—or makes a common European security policy harder to sustain.
