Poland’s budget for 2027 is increasingly exposed to President Karol Nawrocki’s vetoes, with blocked tax changes potentially costing the state billions of złoty and complicating efforts to reduce the deficit.
Six presidential vetoes could cost the Polish budget 8.04bn złoty, while total foregone revenue may reach between 10bn and 15bn złoty a year, according to an assessment by Erste Bank reported by Wprost on 8 September 2026. The figures underline how the political confrontation between Nawrocki, backed by the opposition Law and Justice party (PiS), and Donald Tusk’s government is now directly affecting Poland’s public finances.
The immediate dispute centres on tax measures planned by the government for the 2027 budget. If the president blocks those initiatives, the state will lose revenue that ministers had expected to collect. The resulting gap would make it harder for the government to carry out the fiscal consolidation needed to bring down the deficit and could force Poland to look for additional sources of financing.
A veto with a direct cost
The estimated 8.04bn złoty linked to the six vetoes represents the clearest measure yet of the financial consequences of the presidential-government stand-off. The broader estimate of 10bn to 15bn złoty in missed budget income reflects the wider effect of blocked or delayed government initiatives, rather than a single measure or one-off expense.
That distinction matters for the 2027 budget. The issue is not simply whether individual tax proposals become law, but whether the government can rely on the income assumed in its financial planning. Presidential opposition reduces the room available to adjust the balance between revenue and spending, leaving ministers with fewer options if the planned changes do not take effect.
Nawrocki’s vetoes therefore turn a political disagreement into a recurring budgetary problem. By blocking government tax initiatives, the president cuts potential state income at a time when Poland is already seeking to contain its deficit and manage rising debt. The government must either identify alternative funding or accept that consolidation will be slower and more difficult.
Less room for unexpected spending
The consequences extend beyond the immediate shortfall. A weaker revenue position would reduce the budget’s reserve for unforeseen expenditure, limiting the state’s ability to respond to costs that were not fully anticipated when the budget was prepared.
That narrowing of the fiscal buffer is particularly significant because it leaves less flexibility in future decisions. Measures that might otherwise be financed from available reserves could require new borrowing or the reallocation of money from other priorities. The political dispute thus places pressure not only on the government’s deficit-reduction plans but also on its capacity to finance key needs.
The confrontation also creates a problem of predictability. The government may design a tax policy and a budget on the assumption that legislation will pass, only for a presidential veto to remove part of the expected income. Repeated disruption makes financial planning more difficult and increases the need to account for outcomes that depend on political decisions rather than the government’s stated programme.
Credit-rating risk grows
The deteriorating fiscal outlook could also increase the risk of a downgrade to Poland’s credit rating. The assessment described in the report links the continuing struggle over government legislation with a greater possibility that investors will view the country’s public finances less favourably.
A weaker rating would add to the pressure on a state already facing the need to find additional financing. It could make the budget crisis deeper by reducing confidence in the government’s ability to control the deficit and stabilise debt. The effect of each veto would therefore go beyond the value of the tax measure it blocks.
If the stand-off continues, Poland could end up with one of the highest budget deficits in the European Union. That outcome is not presented as inevitable, but it is the central risk identified by the current trajectory: the president’s repeated intervention could prevent the government from implementing the measures it considers necessary for fiscal consolidation, while leaving the country with less revenue, a smaller reserve and fewer ways to absorb further pressure.
Should Poland prioritise the president’s power to block government measures or the government’s need to secure predictable budget revenue?
