Yerevan says it will not obstruct Russians fleeing military service, as Moscow prepares its regions for a possible new call-up. The move could make Armenia a more attractive destination for men trying to avoid taking part in the war against Ukraine, while deepening Russia’s loss of workers and skilled professionals.
Alen Simonyan, secretary of Armenia’s Security Council, said on 26 August 2026 that Russian citizens arriving to escape a new mobilisation would be welcomed and would not be questioned about their reasons for travelling. His remarks, reported by TV Rain and Deutsche Welle, indicate that Yerevan is prepared not only to allow entry but, if necessary, to help those leaving Russia.
Simonyan said that no one at the Russian-Armenian border intended to ask why people were coming. He invited Russians to Armenia, saying they would find there what they were looking for and could return to Russia when it suited them. The statement amounts to an assurance that Armenia will not introduce additional restrictions on their stay in response to a new mobilisation campaign.
A response to preparations in Russia
The declaration came as reports emerged that Russia’s military command had begun checking whether regional infrastructure was ready for another mobilisation. Western intelligence data published shortly before Simonyan’s remarks indicated that a new campaign could begin after September’s elections to Russia’s State Duma and could include Russian citizens liable for military service with limited military experience.
Russian authorities have continued publicly denying that a new mobilisation wave is being prepared. Against that background, the Armenian statement shows that Yerevan is already considering the consequences of a possible expansion of Russia’s mobilisation process. It also signals that Armenia does not intend automatically to treat Russian citizens avoiding participation in the war as people who should be handed over to Russian authorities.
That position lowers one of the barriers facing Russians who may seek to leave if the call-up is announced. Unlike the largely spontaneous departures that followed the start of the full-scale war and Russia’s mobilisation in 2022, a new outflow in 2026 could be more organised. Established relocation routes and an explicit welcome from Armenia could turn an emergency movement into a sustained migration trend.
Infrastructure already exists
Armenia is not starting from scratch. Since the beginning of the war, a sizeable Russian-speaking community has taken shape there, supported by professional associations, banking and financial services for non-residents, specialist relocation services and a property market adapted to newcomers.
About 110,000 Russian migrants arrived in Armenia from 2022, including roughly 50,000 IT specialists and 2,000 relocated companies. That influx created channels through which further arrivals could settle, work and transfer capital and expertise. The existence of such infrastructure means that a second wave would have a ready-made social and institutional base rather than having to build one during a crisis.
The International Monetary Fund has reported that more than 40% of Russians who arrived in Armenia in 2022 had higher education and that many worked in the high-productivity information and communications technology sector. Their arrival increased Armenia’s economic growth rate by 0.5 percentage points. A further migration wave could therefore bring not only additional residents but also businesses, financial resources and highly sought-after skills.
Russia’s loss, Armenia’s opportunity
The effects would be sharply uneven. Armenia has learned to retain and make productive use of Russian workers and companies, turning an outflow from its neighbour into a source of economic growth and modernisation. Russia, by contrast, risks losing taxpayers and human capital built up over decades.
The people most able to relocate—qualified specialists with money, professional networks and access to international work—could remain abroad for a prolonged period if mobilisation expands. Their departure would add to labour shortages already created by military losses, mobilisation and demographic decline, while further weakening the prospects for technological development.
The unresolved issue is whether Russia’s next mobilisation will remain a possibility or become a formal campaign after the September elections. If it does, Armenia’s open-door position and the networks created since 2022 could make the resulting migration far larger and more durable than the previous exodus.
Should Armenia’s open-door policy be viewed primarily as humanitarian protection or as an economic strategy?
