Russia is preparing to spend 59.58 billion roubles over three years on the systems used to filter internet traffic and disrupt VPN connections. The proposed increase would give the state a larger technical apparatus for controlling online access, even as the federal budget faces a substantial deficit.
The figures appeared in reporting in September and October 2026, after elections to the State Duma and amid a widening campaign against services that help users reach blocked websites. They point to a shift from isolated bans towards a permanent infrastructure for deciding which connections, platforms and information sources can function inside Russia.
A near-doubling of the main control system
The draft federal budget allocates 19.87 billion roubles to the Main Radio Frequency Centre in 2027, 19.84 billion in 2028 and a further 19.87 billion in 2029. The three sums are linked to the Automated Internet Security System, known as ASBI, which is operated through Roskomnadzor, Russia’s communications regulator.
ASBI manages the technical means used to counter perceived threats to the Russian network. These systems can filter traffic, slow websites and digital services, restrict connections or make them inaccessible. Their significance lies in their reach: intervention can take place at network level, rather than through a separate decision against each individual website.
Earlier plans had allocated 9.87 billion roubles to ASBI in 2027 and 9.84 billion in 2028. The revised figures therefore amount to almost twice the previously planned spending. The proposed budget does not merely add another round of website blocking; it finances the machinery behind those restrictions on a multi-year basis.
The wider budget of Roskomnadzor is also expected to rise by about 60 per cent, reaching 31.8 billion roubles in 2027. The increase is consistent with a broader move towards so-called allow lists, in which selected websites and services remain available while other connections are restricted. That reverses the usual presumption of open access: users can increasingly reach what the authorities have permitted, rather than what the global network makes available.
Novaya Gazeta Europe reported on the proposed allocations. Further coverage appeared through Ostorozhno, Novosti, RuReporter and The Moscow Times.
Blocking the bypass, not just the website
Russia’s approach to VPNs has also become broader. Rather than targeting only individual providers, the authorities have moved towards blocking subnets and large pools of IP addresses associated with hosting companies. Reports from September 2026 said that this method disrupted more than 10 major VPN services at the same time.
Blocking at that level can affect more than the original target. Businesses that depend on international platforms or secure connections may have to find replacement tools, increasing their technical and financial costs. Internet providers and hosting companies face a different problem: a large address range can contain legitimate websites and applications alongside the service the authorities intended to restrict.
For ordinary users, the cause of a failure is often invisible. A connection may stop working because of a court order, a regulator’s technical decision, an automated filter or an overly broad IP-address block. As more controls are imposed through network infrastructure, it becomes harder to distinguish deliberate censorship from collateral disruption.
VPNs have been widely used in Russia to reach websites and platforms blocked by the authorities, including independent media, social networks and messaging services. The campaign against them therefore targets both a privacy technology and one of the main practical means of circumventing online restrictions.
Reporting cited in the budget coverage said that 258 VPN services were blocked in 2025, followed by further waves of restrictions in 2026. The same reports referred to an objective of blocking 92 per cent of VPN services in Russia by 2030.
That target was reportedly included in subsidy documents for the Main Radio Frequency Centre covering 2025 and 2026. The documents were removed from Roskomnadzor’s website in May 2026, according to the reports. The 92 per cent figure is therefore a reported target rather than one that can be independently assessed here. Its disappearance nevertheless makes it more difficult for the public to examine how the system’s goals are defined, funded and measured.
Monitoring young people under a broad label
The draft budget also increases funding for the Centre for the Study and Network Monitoring of the Youth Environment. The organisation was created after a direct instruction from President Vladimir Putin and describes its role as protecting young people from “destructive content”.
Earlier plans set aside 1.04 billion roubles for the centre in 2027. The revised figures would raise annual funding to about 1.3 billion roubles, producing a total of roughly 3.9 billion roubles from 2027 to 2029. That is close to 300 million roubles more each year than previously planned.
The official justification focuses on youth protection. More state-funded monitoring also creates greater capacity to locate, classify and report online material, as well as to observe young people’s digital activity. The unresolved issue is how widely the authorities will interpret “destructive content” and what safeguards will apply when online behaviour or material is placed under that label.
This programme adds a different layer to the technical controls managed through Roskomnadzor. ASBI determines how traffic and services move through the network; the youth-monitoring centre searches for material considered harmful or unacceptable. Together, the systems could give the state greater influence over what young users find, share and discuss.
A permanent system with permanent costs
The timing of the proposed spending matters. The figures emerged after the September 2026 State Duma elections, while the authorities were expanding action against VPNs and other circumvention tools. Internet censorship is being treated not as a temporary response to particular websites, but as a continuing state function with dedicated equipment, funding and performance targets.
Maintaining that system will require continuing expenditure. Authorities must operate traffic-inspection equipment, update lists of blocked addresses, identify new circumvention methods and adapt the network as providers change their technology. Broad IP restrictions can also weaken the reliability of hosting networks and disrupt services that were not directly selected for censorship.
The proposed allocations do not establish that every restricted service or monitored user is politically sensitive. They do show that digital control remains a protected priority despite pressure on public finances. The state is investing not only in the power to remove particular services, but in the infrastructure that determines whether an online connection is permitted in the first place.
The question for the next three years is how widely that new capacity will be used and how much of its operation will remain visible to the public. As filtering, VPN disruption and youth-content monitoring are funded together, access to Russia’s open internet is set to depend increasingly on technical permission from the state.
