Aggressive orbital manoeuvres and the growing risk to German space assets
On 19 November, Deutsche Welle reported — citing an investigation by WDR, NDR and Süddeutsche Zeitung — that Russian satellites repeatedly approached German spacecraft at distances close enough to intercept communications signals. One incident involved direct disruption of a Bundeswehr satellite’s signal, prompting Major General Michael Traut, commander of Germany’s Space Command, to warn: “We are under threat. Russia truly has the capability to endanger us in space and create significant interference.”
According to the French space-monitoring company Aldoria, suspicious approaches have been recorded since April 2023, with Russian satellites coming within 140 km of German ones — a proximity that already allows signal interception. In August 2024, the Russian reconnaissance satellite Luch (“Olymp”) approached a German military satellite at only 88 km. Earlier this year, Russia disrupted another German spacecraft by targeting it from a ground station, causing hours-long communication outages.
These actions follow earlier warnings by German defence minister Boris Pistorius, who noted in September that Russia and China are rapidly expanding their military capabilities in space, posing a “fundamental threat” to Europe. Berlin has since unveiled a plan to invest €35 billion by 2030 in both defensive and offensive space capabilities, including new early-warning, reconnaissance and communications satellites, as well as a dedicated command centre for military space operations.
Hybrid warfare reaches orbit: strategic pressure, legal vacuum and NATO’s response
The close-proximity manoeuvres of Russian satellites are widely interpreted as deliberate intimidation. Approaching foreign spacecraft at critical distances is not only an attempt to intercept data, but also a way to study vulnerabilities and signal that Moscow sees space as an arena for hybrid confrontation. Similar attempts to jam or surveil British military satellites confirm a broader pattern: Russia is extending its grey-zone operations into orbit, testing NATO’s political will to respond to non-traditional threats.
Since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has increasingly interfered with satellite navigation systems affecting EU civil aviation — complicating flight routes and raising risks for passenger aircraft. This is a striking example of dual-use technological disruption as a tool of hybrid aggression against civilian infrastructure. In October, the head of UK Space Command, General Paul Tedman, also confirmed that Russia is monitoring and attempting to collect intelligence from British military satellites, underscoring the systematic nature of Moscow’s space activities.
The militarisation of space is no longer theoretical. Russia and China are actively developing capabilities for orbital warfare, including kinetic anti-satellite systems. Western states now face the urgent need to adapt defence doctrines to space-based threats — not only through new hardware, but also through shared NATO standards for responding to aggression in orbit. Germany’s long-term investment plan reflects an understanding that control of space is indispensable for national and allied security.
Space must now be viewed as part of the broader front line of hybrid war: communication, navigation and surveillance systems are critical assets whose disruption could paralyse both military and civilian structures. This requires stronger protection of orbital infrastructure and the development of binding international rules to limit hostile actions in space.
Russia’s refusal in April 2024 to support a UN resolution banning the deployment of weapons — including nuclear devices — in outer space signals a deliberate rejection of international norms. It contradicts the principles of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and highlights Moscow’s intention to maintain strategic ambiguity and retain the option of escalation in one of the least regulated domains of global security.
