Growing concerns over cross-border covert operations
Poland’s security establishment is warning of an escalation in sabotage and covert activity conducted by Russian and Belarusian intelligence services, with senior military officials describing the threat as persistent, adaptive and strategically targeted. In an interview published on 16 November, General Pawel Beliavny said Moscow’s intelligence network has retained a high level of operational capability despite the Russian army’s setbacks in Ukraine. He stressed that Russian services possess extensive institutional memory, deep familiarity with Polish territory and long-standing infiltration routes, allowing them to operate “in nearly every sphere” of national life.
Beliavny argued that Poland’s defence spending must be matched by investments in internal security, as years of lax oversight enabled the entry of individuals who should never have crossed the border or who should have been monitored. According to him, Russia prepared not only for its attack on Ukraine but also for exploiting Poland’s vulnerabilities, with the country’s borders and homes “open to everyone, including Russian spies.”
Recent disclosures have reinforced those warnings. In late October, prosecutors uncovered a plot linked to Russian intelligence involving a sabotage group preparing attacks against Poland and other EU member states. Investigators said the group attempted to ship parcels containing explosive and incendiary materials to Ukraine from Polish territory, intending for them to detonate during transport. Authorities stated that the goal was to spread fear among civilians and destabilise EU countries supporting Ukraine, but the packages were intercepted before they could cause harm.
Hybrid tactics targeting Poland and the wider EU
Poland’s heightened exposure stems from its role as a key logistical hub for humanitarian, military and transport routes to Ukraine, making it strategically important for both sides of the war. Intelligence assessments indicate that Russia has expanded its covert operations across the EU since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, using European territory as a platform for destabilisation, sabotage and influence campaigns. These actions range from deploying undercover agents to orchestrating disruptive incidents and information provocations designed to undermine public trust and weaken political stability.
Officials and analysts describe these activities as systemic and long-term, rooted in Russia’s extensive knowledge of local infrastructures and social environments. Such familiarity enables precise, low-cost operations and shows that Moscow’s intelligence services retain the capacity to conduct complex missions abroad. The General Staff of Poland recently reported “intensive psychological operations against Ukraine,” including narratives aimed at fuelling fear about alleged Ukrainian claims against Poland and efforts to inflame anti-Ukrainian sentiment.
Security experts warn that Russia’s strategy seeks to erode Western unity by instilling distrust in governments that support Kyiv. Penetration attempts through asylum procedures, migration flows or political opposition groups have added new layers of risk. According to Beliavny, Western intelligence services must move toward a proactive model of countering hybrid threats, reinforcing counterintelligence, tightening asylum and visa processes, and strengthening oversight of critical infrastructure. Investments in analytical capacity, cyber defence and the detection of covert influence networks are increasingly viewed as essential to addressing challenges that Poland and its partners will continue to face.
