Moldova’s Central Election Commission (CEC) has urged all religious denominations to refrain from participating in political campaigning during the ongoing parliamentary elections. The statement on August 31 followed an event held two days earlier, when the pro-Russian “Patriotic Bloc” led by Igor Dodon, Vladimir Voronin, Irina Vlah and Vasile Tarlev launched their campaign outside the historic Capriana Monastery. The CEC reminded that Moldovan law prohibits churches and clergy from engaging in electioneering or political activities. In response, the monastery’s abbot, Archimandrite Filaret, and Bishop Ioan (Moșneguță), vicar of the Moldovan Metropolis of the Russian Orthodox Church, stressed that the monastery remained outside politics and pledged that the Metropolis would soon issue a formal circular distancing itself from campaigning.
Political use of the Orthodox Church
The episode underscores a broader pattern in which pro-Russian political groups rely on the structures of the Moldovan Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchate to influence voters. This became evident during the 2024 constitutional referendum on European integration and the presidential election, when clergy in Gagauzia and Transnistria openly urged parishioners to reject pro-EU policies and oppose President Maia Sandu. Some priests even resisted Metropolitan Vladimir of Chișinău, who has sought to keep the Church formally neutral.
Kremlin’s strategic pressure
In 2025, with over two-thirds of Moldovans expressing trust in religious institutions and more than 87% identifying as Orthodox, the Kremlin reportedly instructed loyal clergy to intensify efforts to mobilize believers. Archbishop Marchel of Bălți and Fălești, one of the most influential hierarchs, accused the pro-European government of destroying Orthodoxy and promoting “total Romanianization.” He had already been fined in 2024 for political preaching. Other clerics regularly attack the Sandu administration over alleged promotion of “non-traditional values” and ties to the Romanian Orthodox Church, framing these issues as existential threats.
From propaganda to financing networks
Pro-Russian priests not only use sermons to spread anti-Western narratives but also turn monasteries and parishes into hubs for producing and distributing propaganda. These centers serve as platforms for sympathetic journalists, bloggers and political commentators. According to Moldovan authorities, networks linked to businessman Ilan Shor and Russian oligarch Konstantin Malofeev cooperate with the Church to channel cash into Moldova, funding pro-Russian parties, protests and provocations. Religious institutions, expected to remain outside politics, have thus become instruments in the wider geopolitical struggle between Moscow and Western democracies.
