A high-profile trial opened in Helsinki on 25 August 2025 against the captain and two officers of the tanker Eagle S, accused of deliberately dragging an 11-ton anchor across the seabed of the Gulf of Finland on 25 December 2024. Prosecutors allege that the maneuver severed five undersea lines, including the electricity interconnector EstLink-2 linking Finland and Estonia and four internet cables. The defendants have denied the charges, describing the case as a “maritime accident” and challenging Finland’s jurisdiction on the grounds that the damage occurred outside territorial waters. Prosecutors insist on intent and are seeking at least 2.5 years in prison for serious property damage and interference with telecommunications, as detailed in the trial proceedings.
Baltic undersea infrastructure as a strategic weak point
The damage to the EstLink-2 interconnector, which transmits around 650 megawatts as part of the Finland–Estonia grid link of roughly 1 gigawatt, exposed NATO’s vulnerabilities where energy and data cables run close together. In the United States, similar “risk clusters” exist near coastal landing stations in New Jersey, Virginia Beach, and California. A single incident could simultaneously disrupt power networks and government data traffic, underscoring the need for combined risk mapping and cluster-level protection rather than isolated line security.
Shadow fleet and hybrid operations
The Eagle S has been linked to Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet” — older tankers sailing under flags of convenience, with opaque ownership structures, often used to circumvent oil sanctions. In the context of hybrid operations, such vessels can serve as platforms for “anchor attacks” in congested straits, where attribution is difficult and legal responsibility ambiguous. Analysts warn that enhanced monitoring of high-risk ships near undersea cables and offshore assets, along with rapid data-sharing agreements among allies, is essential to counteract this grey-zone tactic.
NATO and regional response
Since the October 2023 damage to the Balticconnector gas pipeline and several telecom cables between Finland and Estonia — an incident linked to the Chinese container ship NewNew Polar Bear, whose anchor was recovered near the site — the Baltic has become a flashpoint for undersea security. Finland (April 2023) and Sweden (March 2024) joined NATO, prompting the alliance to deploy mechanisms for protecting critical undersea infrastructure. In parallel, GPS jamming and spoofing incidents have risen, complicating navigation and maritime investigations. The Baltic states and their allies have intensified patrols, deployed underwater drones, and established joint monitoring centers, effectively creating a prototype “umbrella” over cables and pipelines.
Kremlin’s broader tactics
The pattern fits a wider Kremlin playbook: under the guise of “technical incidents,” Moscow tests the resilience of NATO and EU undersea infrastructure. Shadow tankers dragging anchors, GPS interference, and jurisdictional disputes form a toolkit aimed at raising the cost of security while maintaining plausible deniability. Beyond anchor damage, Russian research and hydrographic vessels, operating under scientific pretexts, have been suspected of mapping cable routes, timing patrol responses, and preparing future anchor operations. Experts see this as a deliberate strategy of attrition — cheap, deniable, and disruptive — targeting both energy security and digital connectivity.
Strategic implications
Almost all international data flows through submarine fiber optics, making cable security synonymous with economic security. The Baltic case illustrates how a single anchor operation can cause tens of millions of euros in direct losses and months of degraded services. With Russia weaving together multi-vector incidents — cable cuts, GPS disruptions, port collisions — governments are forced into fragmented responses, losing precious time to legal formalities. This erodes trust, inflates insurance premiums, delays repairs, and reveals the fragility of essential services — precisely the effect Moscow seeks. As analysts in Finland underline, NATO and EU readiness will increasingly be measured by how quickly they detect, respond, and restore critical undersea infrastructure in the face of hybrid threats.
