Companies based in the Czech Republic and Serbia have been supplying alcoholic beverages to structures linked to Russia’s foreign intelligence service, despite the political and moral constraints imposed after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. An analysis of customs data and Russian state contracts published on 13 January 2026 indicates that two Czech companies and one Serbian firm, all owned by businessman Mikhail Kapitonov, delivered Czech beer to Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) at least until spring 2025.
The central intermediary in the scheme was the Russian company PintaKlab, which has long supplied alcohol to entities connected to the SVR. Customs records show that between September 2024 and February 2025, PintaKlab received 1,283,436 litres of Czech beer worth around 25m Czech crowns. The assortment included well-known brands such as Budějovický Budvar and Lobkowicz, alongside labels produced specifically for the Russian market.
State contracts link supplies to intelligence infrastructure
A significant share of the deliveries consisted of the Velká pinta brand, which alone accounted for nearly one million litres. The beer was sold onward to the federal state enterprise FKP Yasen, an entity established in 2002 by the SVR itself and integrated into its support infrastructure. FKP Yasen holds a valid licence to trade alcohol until 2030 and operates sanatoriums in Moscow, Sochi and the annexed Crimea.
Records from Russia’s state procurement register for 2023–2024 confirm contracts between PintaKlab and FKP Yasen. These links underscore that the trade was not random retail activity but part of a structured supply chain servicing an organisation closely tied to Russian intelligence.
Sanctions gaps and ethical concerns
Beer is not included on the list of sanctioned goods, yet many European producers publicly pledged to exit the Russian market in solidarity with Ukraine. Against this backdrop, the use of intermediaries and tailor-made brands suggests a deliberate effort to preserve access to Russia through legal grey zones. Investigations into the scheme were detailed by Page Not Found.
Supplying goods to structures associated with the SVR raises acute ethical and reputational questions. The SVR is not a neutral state body but a security service actively involved in hostile intelligence and influence operations against EU and NATO member states. Any form of cooperation, even through civilian goods, risks undermining declared positions of solidarity with Ukraine and weakens public trust in voluntary business disengagement from Russia.
Security implications for the Czech Republic and the EU
For the Czech Republic, the issue carries particular sensitivity. Russian intelligence services have been implicated in espionage, disinformation and sabotage operations on Czech territory, including the 2014 explosions at ammunition depots in Vrbětice. Continued commercial links with entities tied to Russian intelligence therefore intersect not only with ethics but also with national security considerations.
The case also reflects a broader trend of maintaining EU–Russia trade flows through non-sanctioned categories. In 2024, the Czech Republic exported more than 33,000 tonnes of beer to Russia, a record volume, surpassed in Europe only by Germany. Such figures highlight the gap between political declarations and economic practice, reinforcing Moscow’s perception that European unity contains exploitable vulnerabilities.
Calls for greater transparency and oversight
Analysts argue that government responses should not be limited to statements that no formal sanctions were breached. Instead, they call for enhanced transparency in export data, disclosure of ultimate beneficiaries and closer scrutiny of contracts involving Russian state-linked entities, particularly those connected to security services.
As Russia continues its war against Ukraine, even indirect tax revenues from civilian goods contribute to sustaining a state engaged in large-scale aggression. The distinction between “non-military” trade and wartime support is increasingly blurred, strengthening the case for tighter oversight and coordinated EU-level action to close remaining loopholes.
