Alice Weidel’s proposed redesign of the European Union would weaken the institutions that hold the bloc together and return authority to national governments. The AfD leader is also promising to end German financial support for Ukraine, while leaving open a review of Germany’s EU membership if her reforms cannot be delivered.
Reported by Euronews on 22 October 2026, the proposals combine an institutional rollback with a major change in foreign policy. Their practical impact would depend on whether the AfD can build a wider alliance with right-wing parties across Europe.
Power would move out of Brussels
Weidel’s programme calls for the powers of the European Commission to be reduced and for member states to pay less into the EU budget. The Commission has a central role in proposing and implementing common European policies. Curtailing its authority and limiting the resources available to the Union would therefore affect more than one institution: it could make shared decisions harder to finance and carry out.
The AfD also wants to end direct elections to the European Parliament. Under its alternative model, national parliaments would delegate representatives to the assembly. The Parliament’s political legitimacy would then come less directly from European voters and more from the parliamentary majorities of individual member states.
That would alter the balance between national and supranational power. Governments and domestic political parties would gain influence, while the independent role of European institutions would be reduced. Common policies could become more closely tied to the priorities of individual capitals, making agreement between member states more difficult.
The proposal is not simply a German argument over the division of powers. Weidel wants to strengthen cooperation among right-wing parties and is aiming for a right-wing majority in the European Parliament. The AfD is therefore seeking to change the political forces inside the EU as well as the relationship between Germany and Brussels.
Ukraine policy would reinforce the pressure
The institutional changes are paired with a sharp shift in Germany’s policy towards Russia’s war against Ukraine. Weidel has promised to end German financial support for Kyiv and supports a peace agreement that takes Russian security interests into account. Her position also points towards a review of the EU’s approach to sanctions.
Germany ending its assistance would not determine the policy of every other member state. It could, however, make agreement on future aid more difficult and widen existing differences over the war. If Berlin also pressed for a different sanctions policy, securing consensus on maintaining or expanding economic pressure on Russia could become harder.
This is where the possible effects of Weidel’s programme overlap with strategic interests commonly attributed to the Kremlin: a less united Europe, less certain support for Ukraine and weaker coordination on sanctions. That overlap does not establish that the AfD is directed or controlled by Russia. The concrete question is whether the proposed policies would reduce the EU’s ability to act collectively.
The consequences for Ukraine would extend beyond the value of German assistance. Berlin’s position helps shape the political environment in which other European governments decide how much support to provide and how long restrictive measures against Russia should remain in place. A German withdrawal could encourage deeper divisions, although the scale of any effect would depend on the response of the other member states.
A membership review as a political lever
The AfD’s plans go further than a redistribution of authority between European institutions and national governments. If its reforms cannot be implemented, the party allows for Germany’s EU membership to be reviewed.
That prospect turns membership itself into leverage in the argument over the Union’s future. The debate would move beyond the Commission’s powers, the size of the common budget or the composition of the European Parliament and towards the more fundamental question of whether Germany should remain part of the existing European order.
Germany’s position gives the threat particular weight. It is one of the EU’s largest political and economic powers, so even the prospect of reconsidering its membership would affect the wider structure of the bloc. It would also raise a question about whether the AfD’s institutional demands are intended as a programme for reform or as a route towards a looser form of cooperation.
Weidel’s strategy rests on securing support from other radical-right parties and turning that support into a majority capable of changing the EU’s direction. Without such an alliance, the proposals remain a political platform. If one can be assembled, the dispute would reach beyond Germany’s relations with Brussels: the Union’s institutional independence, its support for Ukraine and its capacity to agree common action would all be tested at once.
