Poland’s state-owned defence group wants private industry woven more tightly into the country’s military production system. The aim is to expand output faster, strengthen supply chains and make the industrial base more useful in a prolonged security crisis linked to the growing threat from Russia.
Adam Leszkiewicz, chief executive of Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (PGZ), set out the approach during an appearance in Szczecin on 16 October 2026. His remarks were reported by the insider_poland Telegram channel.
A different way to think about production
Leszkiewicz said that, under current security conditions, no type of weapon or military equipment is made entirely independently. The point is less that Poland lacks defence-manufacturing expertise than that modern military systems depend on a web of companies, technologies and production stages.
A single programme may require specialist electronics, precision components, software, materials, assembly, testing, maintenance and spare parts. Even a large state-controlled group cannot necessarily provide every one of those capabilities inside its own factories. Its effectiveness depends on how well it can organise the wider industrial chain.
PGZ’s proposed answer is a more systematic partnership with private firms. Companies outside the state sector could supply components, undertake specialised manufacturing, provide engineering services or contribute new technologies. Publicly controlled businesses would remain central to strategic planning and major programmes, but would no longer be expected to carry the industrial burden alone.
That represents a shift from viewing the private sector mainly as a source of occasional contracts to treating it as a potential extension of national defence capacity. The practical question is whether existing commercial capabilities can be connected to military requirements quickly enough to matter during a crisis.
Why speed and endurance matter
The plan is being framed against the prospect of a longer confrontation rather than a short-term increase in orders. In that setting, defence readiness depends on more than buying new equipment. Poland would also need to keep systems running, repair damaged or worn platforms, replace components and sustain deliveries while demand rises.
That places a premium on industrial capacity that can expand without being built from scratch. New state factories and production lines can take years to establish. Linking PGZ to private manufacturers could provide additional facilities, skilled workers and technical expertise more quickly, assuming that companies have clear specifications, access to finance and enough certainty about future orders.
A wider network could also reduce reliance on a small number of state plants. Different businesses might take responsibility for different parts of a programme, allowing PGZ to combine specialised capabilities across several sites. The same network could support repairs and upgrades, not just the manufacture of new equipment.
For Warsaw, the arrangement offers a way to enlarge the defence-industrial base without requiring every investment to be made directly by the state. For private companies, it opens a route into a strategic market that has traditionally been dominated by public-sector firms. Longer-term military contracts could help justify investment in machinery, research and specialist staff.
Opening the door creates new demands
More private participation would not automatically make the system faster or more resilient. A larger network would need common standards for quality, testing, industrial security and the handling of sensitive information. PGZ and the authorities would also have to decide which capabilities must remain available in Poland and where dependence on overseas suppliers is acceptable.
Coordination would become more important as the number of participants increased. Companies vary in size, financial strength, technical standards and experience of defence work. Without central planning, adding suppliers could simply lengthen production chains rather than improve them.
Continuity would be another test. Firms are more likely to invest in military production when they can see a reliable pipeline of work, rather than a temporary rush of orders. Contracts, procedures and testing arrangements would need to be established before a crisis, not improvised once demand had already surged.
The Szczecin announcement therefore sets out a strategic direction rather than describing a fully integrated production system already in place. Its significance will depend on whether PGZ can turn the principle of private-sector involvement into specific programmes, investment decisions and dependable supply relationships.
The central test is practical: whether Poland can build an industrial network capable of producing, repairing and replenishing military equipment for as long as a serious confrontation requires. Until those links are backed by concrete commitments, the private sector remains a planned reserve of defence capacity rather than one that has already been proved in a crisis.
