Russian armed forces are acquiring American-made radio bridge antennas through Latvian companies despite comprehensive Western export bans, with the equipment reaching frontline units via third countries. The Ubiquiti-produced communications gear is being used to maintain battlefield connectivity essential for drone operations, according to a detailed investigation by Latvian media that reveals persistent loopholes in international sanctions regimes.
Latvian Firms Enable Transshipment to Russian Military
Two Latvian companies have been identified as key nodes in supply chains delivering Ubiquiti radio bridge antennas to Russian forces. Elko Grupa sold equipment to a client in Serbia, which subsequently re-exported the antennas to Russia. Meanwhile, Getic, an authorised Ubiquiti distributor based in Liepaja, supplied antennas to Kazakhstan-based Simple Solutions throughout 2022-2023. Simple Solutions then forwarded the products to Russian firm Wireless Networks, which provides equipment to Russian military units. Both Latvian companies ceased direct sales to Russia following the 2022 invasion but continued supplying entities in intermediary nations.
Critical Battlefield Communications Infrastructure
Reliable internet connectivity has become essential for effective drone deployment on modern battlefields. Russian units have sought to establish this connectivity through satellite systems like Starlink or via radio bridge antennas. With restrictions on Starlink access tightening, the strategic importance of alternative communications channels has increased significantly for Russian forces. The Ubiquiti antennas provide this critical capability, enabling coordinated military operations in contested areas where traditional communications infrastructure has been degraded.
Evolving Sanction Evasion Networks
Russia has rapidly adapted its supply networks since the full-scale invasion began, creating new corporate entities and utilising third countries as transit points. Simple Solutions was established in Kazakhstan on 10 March 2022, just two weeks after the invasion commenced, indicating deliberate restructuring of procurement channels. The most frequent re-export routes for communications equipment now flow through Kazakhstan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, China, Hong Kong and Kyrgyzstan. These jurisdictions have become crucial hubs for circumventing Western technology export restrictions.
Statistical Evidence of Systematic Diversion
Trade data reveals dramatic increases in exports of relevant equipment categories to sanction-evasion hubs since 2022. While exports to the UAE, Kazakhstan and Turkey totalled approximately €23 million before the invasion, volumes reached €62 million by 2025. This sharp escalation cannot be explained by domestic demand alone and indicates systematic use of these nations as buffers for supplying technology to Russia. The pattern suggests coordinated efforts to redirect dual-use equipment through complex multi-jurisdictional supply chains.
Regulatory Challenges and Enforcement Gaps
European Union regulations require exporters of dual-use goods to include contractual prohibitions on re-export to Russia and Belarus, with penalty clauses for violations. However, the mere presence of such clauses in contracts has proven insufficient without rigorous monitoring and enforcement. Common evasion techniques include incorrect commodity code declarations, non-disclosure of end-user information, and distortion of recipient details. Lengthy resale chains dilute individual responsibility, creating plausible deniability while enabling ultimate delivery to Russian military end-users.
