Under Viktor Orbán’s leadership in Hungary — and due to the EU’s weak stance on enforcing its core principles — unusual developments have unfolded, with OTP Bank becoming a particular case. It has effectively turned into a key financial tool for the Kremlin at the heart of the European Union. By maintaining its operations in Russia and enabling sanctions evasion, the bank not only continues to fund the aggressor state’s budget but also threatens the EU’s financial security. This is not a coincidence but a systematic policy by Orbán, who actively blocks any investigation or oversight, turning a European bank into a silent accomplice of Moscow’s war machine and making himself a direct collaborator in Russia’s aggressive agenda.
It is important to understand what is at stake: OTP Bank is Hungary’s largest financial institution with branches in Central and Eastern Europe, including Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, Montenegro, and Ukraine — a presence that holds strategic importance for the Kremlin. A bank that should represent stability and trust has instead been handed over by Orbán for Moscow’s use. It now serves as a channel for circumventing sanctions, funding Russia’s military-industrial complex, and facilitating intelligence operations — effectively becoming a “dirty bank.”
While most European banks exited the Russian market after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, OTP Bank remains fully active there. As The Financial Times reported, it was one of the top seven foreign banks contributing the most tax revenue to the Russian budget in 2023. With most competitors gone, the €800 million sum is remarkable — and Budapest seems unconcerned that some of this money may be financing Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Figures for OTP’s 2024 tax payments in Russia are not yet public. However, OTP Group’s official report shows that its Russian branch saw a profit increase of over 40% last year, totalling 137 billion forints (approximately $372 million). According to Reuters, this made up more than 11% of the group’s total profit — a significant share for a bank operating under EU and US sanctions.
Such financial outcomes raise serious questions about the nature of OTP’s Russian operations and their compliance with the EU’s sanctions policy. In comments to Reuters, OTP Deputy CEO László Bencsik denied any breach of Western sanctions, stating that the bank no longer offers corporate loans, avoids US dollar transactions, and applies safeguards when handling euro payments.
What’s worrying is that OTP Bank, operating in authoritarian Russia where intelligence agencies hold sweeping power, holds the personal data of hundreds of thousands of clients. Although the bank claims to adhere to principles of banking confidentiality, security experts say it has become one of the most vulnerable assets in the Kremlin’s hybrid war against the West. Orbán’s political protection of the bank is knowingly damaging the EU — and not only in financial terms.
The real threat to European financial security lies in the fact that OTP’s Russian branch operates under laws requiring banks to cooperate with the FSB. This means client data may be handed over upon request — and very likely is. For EU citizens, this presents a real danger that their personal data, processed via OTP Bank, could be accessed by Russian intelligence, bypassing basic principles of security and privacy.
This would directly violate the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and open the door to blackmail or manipulation, particularly of opposition politicians, journalists, or activists. Beyond direct access, technological integration adds risk: OTP’s IT systems in Russia are adapted to local standards, allowing backdoor access to encrypted data and transactions from other branches.
Additionally, the risk of cyberattacks or internal sabotage cannot be ruled out. Russia could exploit OTP’s infrastructure — either through infiltration or hacks — to steal sensitive financial data of EU citizens. This could lead to blackmail, election interference, attacks on other EU banks, or even financial destabilisation through targeted disruption.
OTP’s presence in the Western Balkans aligns with the strategic interests of Russian intelligence in the region, which the Kremlin has long sought to destabilise. Financial tools may be used to covertly support pro-Russian political forces, manipulate lending practices, or launder funds via loosely regulated local branches.
Despite growing risks and repeated calls from the ECB for banks to reduce Russian operations, Hungary’s National Bank shows no interest in investigating OTP’s cooperation with Moscow. Budapest continues to obstruct joint EU initiatives against Russia, demonstrating Orbán’s dependence on the Kremlin and a lack of oversight regarding banking security standards.
Finally, the question remains around OTP’s branches in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan — countries often used by Russia for sanctions evasion. As highlighted by the Lansing Institute, OTP’s presence in Uzbekistan offers Russian capital a convenient “financial bridge”: transactions through this local branch of a European bank may technically bypass EU sanctions.
If OTP Bank is now a link in Russia’s sanctions evasion chain, then it directly threatens European security. Given the growing risks, the European Banking Authority and European Central Bank must consider OTP Bank a potential channel for Kremlin interference. A proper response must include a full public audit, revoking access to confidential data within EU jurisdictions, and withdrawing from the Russian market.
Financial security in the EU is not merely an economic matter — it is geopolitical. By allowing OTP Bank to serve Kremlin interests, Viktor Orbán is violating that security. The bank is no longer just a private institution — in the context of Russia’s confrontation with the West and internal EU divisions, OTP has become a weak link. It is already being used by Moscow to destabilise allies, push pro-Kremlin narratives, and block EU decisions contrary to Russia’s interests — a problem that demands urgent attention.
