Moldova heads to parliamentary elections on September 28, 2025, in a vote that could determine whether the country stays on its pro-European path or becomes what critics describe as a “grey zone” on the borders of the EU and NATO. Western officials see Moscow’s attempt to shape a post-election destabilization scenario as a test of Europe’s resolve to defend democratic choices among its neighbors. According to a CBS Research poll conducted September 6–13, the ruling PAS leads with 29.7%, followed by the pro-Russian BCS bloc at 13.2% and “Our Party” at 7.5%, while nearly 27% of voters remain undecided.
Shift in Moscow’s strategy
The resignation of Dmitry Kozak and the transition to a harder “political technology” model under Sergey Kiriyenko marks a shift in the Kremlin’s approach to Moldova. Analysts in Chișinău warn this move signals readiness to pursue more aggressive scenarios should the vote deliver an outcome unfavorable to Moscow. Since 2023, Russia has poured tens of millions of dollars into Moldovan politics, including nearly €100 million in 2024 to derail presidential elections and an EU referendum. This year, investigators uncovered a $39 million funding scheme routed through Promsvyazbank, further exposing the scale of Russian efforts to influence Moldovan politics.
Information warfare and networks of influence
Moldovan authorities say the FSB’s Fifth Service, directed by General Dmitry Milyutin, has built extensive networks of agents, fake social media accounts and content farms on YouTube, Telegram, TikTok and Facebook to discredit President Maia Sandu and her PAS party. Igor Chaika, linked to Rossotrudnichestvo, is identified as a key operator channeling funds through state-backed programs. Plans reportedly include refurbishing the image of Moldova’s Socialist and Communist parties with new leaders and “pro-European” facades, as existing figures such as Ion Ceban face reputational setbacks, including his recent EU entry ban.
Preparing for destabilization
Authorities warn Moscow’s strategy combines political, criminal, financial and religious elements designed to undermine the election’s legitimacy. Scenarios involve mass protests, with Russia planning to send 10,000–15,000 demonstrators, some via third countries, and offering financial incentives to participants. Additional leverage comes from Russia’s offer to allow Moldovan citizens to work without permits in 2025–26, a move officials describe as hidden political bribery. On September 22, Moldovan police detained 74 individuals who had undergone paramilitary training in Serbia, raising concerns over organized violence on election day and beyond.
Regional implications
The Kremlin’s blueprint for post-election unrest reportedly includes recruiting young men from sports clubs and criminal groups to stage provocations during and after the vote, from calling for Sandu’s resignation to alleging fraud if her party wins. The Moldovan Orthodox Church, aligned with the Russian Patriarchate, has also been accused of spreading pro-Kremlin narratives while its cultural centers in Russia help organize transport for protesters. Foreign activists and observers from far-right and far-left groups in Europe are expected to be deployed to lend credibility to claims of electoral violations.
If successful, Russia’s intervention could transform Moldova into an anti-Western outpost, threatening security in Ukraine’s Odesa region, destabilizing Romanian and Ukrainian border areas, and disrupting European transit corridors. Economic coercion and frozen EU funds could deepen social tensions, creating “managed chaos” at the EU’s doorstep. Conversely, a firm European trajectory in Chișinău would deal a blow to Moscow’s strategy in Eastern Europe and reinforce deterrence against future Russian influence operations.
