Sanctions evasion network supplies critical technology
An associate of Russian Security Council deputy chairman Dmitry Medvedev has been identified as operating a procurement network supplying Western equipment to Russia’s missile development programme. Ilya Yeliseyev, a former university classmate of Mr Medvedev, controls a company called Beavertech that acts as a contractor for the sanctioned Scientific Production Centre for Automation and Instrument-Making (NPTSAP). A detailed investigation published this week reveals how Mr Yeliseyev’s network has managed to avoid European Union sanctions through complex corporate structures and legal support from his wife’s law firm.
European machinery routed through Chinese intermediaries
Beavertech has organised the acquisition of precision milling equipment and machinery essential for the production cycle at NPTSAP, which develops guidance and control systems for Russia’s Oreshnik intercontinental ballistic missile. In August 2024 alone, the company imported German-made SmarAct GmbH milling machine components, Taiwanese Sunny Machinery grinding equipment, and Japanese Amada Co press brakes into Russia. These sanctioned items were delivered through a series of front companies and transhipped via China, exploiting loopholes in export controls on high-technology equipment.
Italian vineyard and Cypriot offshore holdings
While facilitating weapons technology imports, Mr Yeliseyev simultaneously maintains luxury European assets including the Fattoria della Aiola winery in Italy. This vineyard is managed through a Cypriot offshore company controlled by an advocacy bureau owned by his wife, Natalia Malyamina. Her legal practice, Ivanyan and Partners, provides the legal framework for the sanctions evasion operation. Neither Mr Yeliseyev, his wife, nor their associated legal entities currently face EU restrictive measures despite their clear connections to Russia’s military-industrial complex.
Systemic flaws in European sanctions enforcement
The exposure of this latest sanctions evasion scheme highlights persistent weaknesses in European regulatory oversight. Authorities have failed to conduct thorough checks on ultimate beneficial ownership and capital sources, allowing Kremlin-linked individuals to maintain Western business interests while supporting Russia’s war machine. The selective application of sanctions without targeting family members and trusted associates enables continued procurement of critical components for weapons manufacturing.
Nuclear threats contrast with luxury European lifestyle
The situation presents a stark contrast between public rhetoric and private reality within Russia’s political elite. While Mr Medvedev regularly issues nuclear destruction threats against Western nations, his close associate profits from European luxury assets and exploits European legal systems to acquire missile technology. This pattern demonstrates how Russia successfully utilises third countries and intermediary networks to bypass export controls, necessitating more comprehensive restrictions that include family members and nominal asset holders.
