Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić on 16 September expressed gratitude to Russia for alerting Belgrade to what he described as preparations for a “colour revolution” on Serbian soil. The remarks came a day after Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service claimed that the EU was seeking to exploit the anniversary of the Novi Sad railway station tragedy of 1 November 2024 to fuel anti-government protests among young people and push for a “loyal leadership” in Serbia. According to the Russian agency, the alleged plan focused on influencing Serbian youth and promoting the idea of a “bright European future” — efforts it said had failed due to patriotic sentiment, the influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and memories of NATO’s 1999 air campaign. Vučić said Belgrade would remain in contact with Moscow and “defend Serbia,” praising Russian intelligence as “one of the largest and most powerful services”.
Protests over Novi Sad tragedy fuel political crisis
Mass demonstrations demanding early elections have rocked Serbia for nearly a year, triggered by the collapse of a concrete roof at Novi Sad railway station on 1 November 2024 that killed 16 people. Protesters are calling for accountability for the disaster, stronger action against corruption, and snap parliamentary polls. The unrest led to the resignation of Prime Minister Miloš Vučević in the spring, while in August demonstrators stormed the ruling Serbian Progressive Party’s office in Novi Sad. Vučić has repeatedly accused foreign actors of instigating the protests, portraying the turmoil as an externally driven campaign.
Balancing between Moscow and Brussels
Vučić has long pursued a dual strategy, balancing Serbia’s EU membership ambitions with its close ties to Russia. His rhetoric often shifts depending on domestic pressures and international scrutiny, a pattern critics in Europe say undermines stability in the Western Balkans. In May 2025, Vučić attended a military parade in Moscow and met Vladimir Putin, drawing sharp criticism in Brussels. Despite regular high-level contacts with Russian officials, he insisted at an international conference that Serbia was not Moscow’s “Trojan horse” in Europe and reaffirmed the country’s EU aspirations, while acknowledging historic ties with Russia Eurointegration coverage.
Energy dependence and EU leverage
Russia maintains significant influence over Serbia’s energy sector. Gazprom supplies about two-thirds of the natural gas consumed in the country, and Belgrade is negotiating with Moscow on new underground storage projects in cooperation with Gazprom and Srbijagas. At the same time, Serbia is seeking to reduce Russian ownership in its national oil company NIS. The EU remains Serbia’s dominant economic partner, accounting for 60% of its foreign trade and providing half of all foreign direct investment in 2023. As a candidate country since 2012, Serbia also receives EU loans and grants worth billions of euros.
Kosovo, disinformation and regional tensions
Russia’s backing of Serbia on the non-recognition of Kosovo further complicates dialogue with Pristina and contributes to recurring tensions. Russian narratives are widely circulated in Serbian media, amplifying anti-Western sentiment and deepening divisions within society. Regional intelligence services, including those in Croatia, warn of coordinated destabilisation efforts by Moscow and Belgrade in the Western Balkans — ranging from disinformation campaigns to espionage activities.
