Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) has publicly accused the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople of alleged “schismatic activity”, marking a sharp escalation in the use of religious narratives within Moscow’s information campaign. In a statement released on 12 January, the SVR claimed that Bartholomew I was seeking to displace Russian Orthodoxy in the Baltic states by promoting parishes subordinate to Constantinople, language that observers describe as unprecedentedly aggressive for an intelligence agency. The statement was published on the SVR’s official website and reported by regional media, including ua.news.
From canon law to intelligence messaging
The tone of the SVR press release went far beyond theological or canonical disagreement. It referred to the Patriarch as an “antichrist in a cassock” and a “devil in the flesh”, while alleging coordination with British intelligence services to promote “Russophobic sentiment” in Europe. Such language, analysts note, resembles tabloid-style propaganda rather than the measured communication traditionally associated with state intelligence bodies, and signals a deliberate effort to inflame tensions between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
The direct involvement of the SVR underscores the strategic importance Moscow assigns to church affairs, particularly in regions such as Ukraine and the Baltic states, where religious jurisdiction intersects with questions of sovereignty, identity and security. By elevating ecclesiastical disputes to the level of intelligence messaging, Russia appears to be treating Orthodoxy as a geopolitical domain rather than a purely religious one.
Baltic states and hybrid pressure
In its statement, the SVR asserted that Constantinople was targeting Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in an attempt to marginalise the Moscow Patriarchate. No evidence was provided to substantiate claims of foreign intelligence coordination or forced restructuring of church life in the region. The Ecumenical Patriarchate has dismissed such allegations as disinformation, stressing that decisions regarding church organisation are rooted in canon law and local pastoral needs, not geopolitical agendas.
Western analysts argue that the Baltic focus is not incidental. The use of inflammatory religious rhetoric may serve as a preparatory information operation aimed at destabilising social cohesion in states that Moscow views as strategically hostile. In this reading, church-related narratives become tools for broader hybrid influence, designed to polarise communities and undermine trust in local institutions.
Beyond a religious dispute
Observers in Europe and Ukraine caution against interpreting the episode as an internal Orthodox quarrel. Instead, they view it as part of a wider Russian strategy that instrumentalises religion to advance state interests, including pressure in the context of Ukraine and potential future negotiations over the status of church structures linked to Moscow. The unprecedented verbal attack by an intelligence service on a global religious leader highlights how far the Kremlin is willing to go in merging ideological, spiritual and security narratives.
As tensions between Moscow and Constantinople deepen, the episode reinforces concerns that religious institutions are being drawn ever more tightly into Russia’s information and hybrid warfare toolkit, with implications extending well beyond ecclesiastical boundaries.
