On January 21, 2026, media reports revealed that Russia has established an extensive intermediary network to procure ship components produced by the Finnish engineering group Wärtsilä, circumventing Western sanctions. The scheme has enabled the supply of spare parts not only to Russia’s civilian fleet but also to vessels linked to its so-called “shadow fleet,” which plays a central role in exporting oil and oil products outside sanction controls.
Between 2023 and 2025, Russian buyers acquired Wärtsilä components worth around €6 million through intermediary companies, with at least 250 shipments identified. The most recent deliveries in 2025 were detected in March, indicating that the supply chains remained active well after sanctions were imposed.
Intermediary networks spanning multiple jurisdictions
One of the key intermediaries identified is Arnika Trade, a company registered in Tbilisi. Its sole declared client is the Russian firm Elite Shipping, which in turn lists Prime Shipping among its customers. Prime Shipping presents itself as one of Russia’s largest carriers of oil and petroleum products, linking the supply of ship components directly to energy exports.
Arnika Trade has emerged as the largest supplier of Wärtsilä products to Russia by shipment volume. In total, nearly 60 Russian companies have purchased Wärtsilä spare parts since the start of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine. Many of these intermediary entities are based in China, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey, and in most cases carried out only a single delivery, a pattern that complicates detection and enforcement.
Wärtsilä’s exit and the grey zone of responsibility
Wärtsilä formally exited the Russian market shortly after the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and announced a full halt to operations in Russia by July that year. Company representatives state that Arnika Trade has never been a client of Wärtsilä and that the firm has no visibility over how the exported spare parts were originally acquired.
According to Wärtsilä, its sales contracts include explicit clauses prohibiting the re-export of products to Russia. Company officials acknowledge, however, that sanction evasion through third parties remains a widespread challenge in global markets, creating a grey zone where formal compliance does not always prevent practical violations.
Strategic importance of Western technology for Russia’s fleet
Western-made engines and components remain critical to the functioning of Russia’s maritime sector, including its shadow fleet. Wärtsilä equipment has historically been installed on Russian cargo vessels, tugboats, and icebreakers. Finnish broadcaster Yle reported that at least 30 vessels among more than 400 shadow fleet ships sanctioned by the EU are equipped with Wärtsilä engines, with the actual number potentially higher. This reliance underscores the strategic value of spare parts for keeping sanctioned vessels operational.
The shadow fleet is a key mechanism allowing Moscow to sustain oil exports despite EU and G7 restrictions, preserving foreign currency revenues that support Russia’s war effort. Without continued access to critical components, the operational capacity of this fleet would be significantly constrained.
Sanctions enforcement under strain
The case illustrates how networks of narrowly specialized intermediaries enable systematic sanctions evasion. Companies created for limited transactions can be quickly replaced once exposed, forming an adaptive and low-cost system for Russia to maintain access to restricted technologies.
Insufficient oversight of end users undermines the credibility of the EU’s sanctions architecture. As long as Russian entities continue to receive Western components indirectly, sanctions risk losing their deterrent effect. Detailed reporting by Yle has intensified calls for stricter monitoring of supply chains, deeper scrutiny of intermediary firms, and broader use of secondary sanctions against actors facilitating such schemes.
