Iran has significantly expanded its military support for Russia, supplying ballistic and air-defence missiles worth an estimated $2.7bn for use in the war against Ukraine, according to materials published on 13 January 2026. The documents indicate that total Russian purchases of Iranian weapons since late 2021 have exceeded $4bn, underscoring the scale of cooperation between Moscow and Tehran amid sustained international sanctions.
The contracts cover hundreds of short-range Fath-360 ballistic missiles, nearly 500 other short-range ballistic missiles and around 200 surface-to-air missiles designed for Russian air-defence systems. In addition, Iran delivered millions of rounds of ammunition and artillery shells, with further consignments expected. The findings were detailed in a report published by Deutsche Welle.
Iranian weapons fill gaps in Russia’s war effort
At the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Iranian supplies helped Moscow compensate for rapid depletion of its own missile stockpiles and limited production capacity. The influx of foreign weapons enabled Russia to sustain intensive strike campaigns and maintain pressure on Ukrainian infrastructure despite growing constraints within its defence industry.
A key element of this cooperation was the transfer of Shahed-136 attack drones and associated production technologies. Under a separate $1.75bn contract signed in early 2023, Russia established domestic manufacturing of the system under the designation Geran-2, embedding Iranian designs into its long-term strike capability.
Broader risks for European security
The delivery of Iranian ballistic and air-defence missiles to Russia carries consequences beyond Ukraine. European officials warn that the deployment of such systems increases escalation risks and affects the wider security architecture of the continent, strengthening arguments for stricter export controls and the use of secondary sanctions against states and companies facilitating these transfers.
Military-technical cooperation between Moscow and Tehran intensified after February 2022, when Russia’s invasion of Ukraine triggered sweeping Western sanctions and marked the deepest crisis in Russia’s relations with the West since the Cold War. In January 2025, the two countries signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement that includes enhanced military cooperation, though Iranian officials emphasised that it falls short of a formal defence alliance.
Partnership of convenience rather than alliance
Despite closer ties, analysts describe the Russia–Iran relationship as transactional and limited. Both governments face international isolation and rely on cooperation to mitigate sanctions, yet neither has shown readiness to assume significant risks for the other. The absence of mutual defence obligations in their partnership agreement reflects this lack of strategic trust.
That limitation became evident when the United States and Israel carried out strikes on Iranian territory last year. Moscow restricted its response to diplomatic rhetoric, avoiding actions that could provoke direct confrontation with Western powers. Russian officials have sought to preserve communication channels with United States, particularly under President Donald Trump, while remaining focused on the war in Ukraine.
Fragile cooperation under mounting pressure
Iran’s domestic challenges, including renewed large-scale anti-government protests, further complicate the durability of this partnership. While arms sales provide Tehran with revenue and leverage, Russia is unlikely to offer substantive military assistance should Iran face a major external crisis.
Over the longer term, Western policymakers assess that sustained pressure on both regimes could weaken their capacity to support one another. In this context, continued assistance to Ukraine is viewed as a central element of containing what increasingly appears to be a situational, sanction-driven partnership between Moscow and Tehran rather than a stable strategic alliance.
