Calls for the European Union to open a political dialogue with Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko risk setting a dangerous precedent for both the EU and the Belarusian democratic opposition. The debate intensified on January 19, 2026, after recently released opposition figure Maria Kolesnikova publicly argued that European leaders should engage with Lukashenko to reduce Belarus’s growing dependence on Russia, according to an interview in the Financial Times.
Kolesnikova, a former campaign chief to opposition leader Viktor Babariko and one of the prominent faces of the 2020 protests, said prolonged isolation was pushing Minsk closer to Moscow and making Belarus “less safe and less predictable” for Europe. She suggested that limited humanitarian concessions, such as the release of political prisoners or easing restrictions on independent media and NGOs, could justify a discussion on easing sanctions.
Pragmatism versus legitimacy
The European Union, unlike the current US administration, continues to regard Lukashenko as an illegitimate leader following the disputed 2020 election and subsequent repression. While limited technical contacts with Belarusian authorities exist, the EU has avoided an active political dialogue. By contrast, representatives of President Donald Trump have visited Minsk several times, resulting in the release of small groups of political prisoners and the partial lifting of US sanctions.
For Lukashenko, such engagement fits a familiar pattern. Political prisoners have long served as bargaining chips in foreign policy negotiations rather than evidence of any genuine liberalisation. Each release has been followed by expectations of political or economic concessions from the West, without altering the fundamentally repressive nature of the regime.
Structural dependence on Moscow remains
Belarus’s deep political, economic and security dependence on Russia sharply limits Minsk’s room for manoeuvre. Cooperation with China has not offset this reliance, particularly in energy, finance and defence. As a result, Lukashenko seeks partial normalisation with Western states not to reform the system, but to reduce isolation while preserving authoritarian control.
Critics argue that calls for dialogue underestimate this reality. Describing Lukashenko as a “pragmatic” actor ignores the systemic character of the Belarusian dictatorship and risks strengthening his negotiating position without extracting meaningful change. In practice, such arguments may serve the regime’s interests more than those of Belarusian society or Europe.
Implications for EU policy and unity
Normalising relations with a leader who openly supports Russia’s war against Ukraine and provides Belarusian territory for Russian military infrastructure raises serious questions about the EU’s consistency and values. Dialogue without prior structural reforms would amount to tacit acceptance of repression, electoral fraud and complicity in aggression.
There is also a risk of internal division within the EU. Member states may interpret “pragmatism” differently, weakening a unified foreign policy approach and creating opportunities for Minsk to exploit differences between European capitals. Such fragmentation would leave the EU more vulnerable to external pressure while further marginalising the Belarusian opposition.
A precedent with wider consequences
Granting legitimacy in exchange for selective humanitarian gestures sends a broader signal beyond Belarus. It suggests that systematic repression and the destruction of civil society can be offset by limited concessions, a message likely to be noted by other authoritarian regimes.
For the EU, the challenge lies in balancing humanitarian outcomes with long-term strategic and moral considerations. Without clear guarantees of political reform and accountability, calls for dialogue with Lukashenko risk undermining European credibility, weakening democratic forces in Belarus and establishing a precedent that could reverberate far beyond Minsk.
