Russia’s influence campaigns are no longer aimed only at discrediting Ukraine’s government. They increasingly target the voters and politicians in European Union and NATO countries whose weapons, money and diplomatic backing keep Kyiv in the war.
The method is a blend of forged documents, cloned news websites, invented scandals and AI-generated videos. The stories vary — a luxury flat in Dubai, soldiers supposedly abused by their commanders, or Western weapons allegedly sold on the black market — but the political purpose is consistent: make Ukraine appear corrupt and unstable, then make its supporters pay a domestic price for continuing to help it.
A lie dressed as journalism
An analysis published in April 2026 examined more than 1,500 videos and websites linked to the Russian network Storm-1516. About 40% of the material was aimed at discrediting Ukraine and President Volodymyr Zelensky, while the relevant content was estimated to have reached more than 66 million users.
The network used forged paperwork, invented eyewitnesses, fabricated investigations and videos featuring artificially created people. The material was adapted into at least 16 languages. In 170 cases, the names or visual identities of genuine media organisations were used to give false claims the appearance of independent reporting.
That imitation is central to the system. A familiar logo, a convincing layout or a television-style voiceover can create an impression of authority before anyone checks the underlying claim. The 2022 Doppelganger network has used websites imitating publications including Der Spiegel, Die Welt, Le Monde and Le Point. Other operations copied the names and design features of the BBC, Bloomberg, Politico and Euronews.
Artificial intelligence makes the process faster. One allegation can be translated, rewritten for a different political audience and repackaged as a video, article or social-media statement. The technology does not invent concerns about corruption, military losses or the cost of aid, but it allows those concerns to be turned into apparently specific evidence at scale.
Luxury, corruption and the presidential family
A campaign launched on 4 and 5 June 2025 claimed that Zelensky had bought his mother a $3.2 million flat in Dubai’s Burj Khalifa. The story was presented in material designed to resemble a television report by Al Arabiya before being circulated across social media.
An internal report attributed to Russia’s Agency for Social Design, dated 9 June 2025, claimed that the campaign generated 86 million views, including 21 million among English-speaking users. That was an estimate in the agency’s report, not an independently measured figure. The message was designed to suggest that Ukraine’s leadership was using Western assistance for personal enrichment — a claim aimed squarely at public debate in donor countries over whether aid is properly controlled.
First lady Olena Zelenska was targeted in a similar campaign. On 17 May 2026, the Russian state news agency RIA Novosti, citing anonymous sources, reported that Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau and Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office were preparing to arrest her. Both institutions rejected the claim on the same day, saying that no such procedural action was under way. The allegation nevertheless continued to circulate through Russian information channels and social networks.
Such claims do not need to be accepted as proven to be politically useful. They can create suspicion, give opponents of further aid a ready-made talking point and make later accusations easier to believe.
Soldiers, generals and artificial evidence
The Ukrainian armed forces have been targeted through fabricated accounts of mistreatment and internal disorder. On 13 May 2026, a series of deepfake videos showed supposed members of the 28th Separate Mechanized Brigade complaining about a lack of rotations, inadequate supplies and poor treatment by commanders. The videos were generated with artificial intelligence and distributed through Russian Telegram channels.
On 3 August, a comparable campaign targeted the 66th Separate Mechanized Brigade. Artificially generated figures wearing Ukrainian uniforms claimed that a brigade commander had beaten soldiers and refused them medical assistance. Specific unit numbers and military clothing were used to make the scenes appear to be insider testimony and to suggest that abuses were systematic.
The senior command was drawn into the same narrative. After Major General Mykhailo Drapaty was appointed commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s armed forces on 22 July 2026, social-media posts alleged conflicts among generals, large-scale inspections of military units and a struggle for control of the army.
At the end of July, a fake account on X using Drapaty’s name was identified. It attracted several thousand followers and published invented statements, including an announcement of a broad audit of the armed forces. AI-generated posts on Facebook and Threads simultaneously depicted supposed public confrontations between Drapaty and his predecessor. The intended image was of a military leadership too divided and unstable to organise Ukraine’s defence effectively.
Earlier, on 28 and 29 January 2026, Telegram channels and other social networks circulated fabricated reports of a serious dispute between Kyrylo Budanov and Valerii Zaluzhnyi. The posts referred to anonymous sources and allegedly secret documents. Ukrainian information-security specialists linked the campaign to an effort to weaken confidence in Budanov and portray a deep split within Ukraine’s leadership. That is an assessment by those specialists, not independent proof of the origin of every individual post.
Weapons allegations aimed at Western voters
The question of Western weapons offers another route into political debate in Europe. During February and March 2026, Russian and information outlets linked to the Iranian regime spread claims that weapons supplied to Ukraine had reached the black market. The same material accused Ukrainian officials of corruption and portrayed the country’s defence industry as ineffective.
On 12 March, pro-Russian accounts distributed a fabricated video made to resemble a publication by the US-based Institute for the Study of War, or ISW. It claimed that Ukraine had sold Western weapons and that the weapons had later reached armed actors in the Middle East. The video also alleged that Kyiv’s offers to help partners fight Iranian drones were intended to conceal the supposed scandal.
ISW had not published the material, and no evidence was presented for the allegations. The imitation relied instead on the authority associated with the institute’s name and visual style. A familiar logo and professional layout can make an unsupported accusation appear to have been investigated by a respected source.
The wider objective was to raise doubts about monitoring of military deliveries and the wisdom of continued support for Ukraine. The intended audience was not only Ukrainians. It was also voters and lawmakers in the countries that decide whether weapons and funding should continue.
An organised network behind the stories
The structure behind part of this activity was described in an investigation by The Insider published on 21 October 2026. The investigation was based on internal correspondence from Russia’s Agency for Social Design. It reported that Sergei Kiriyenko, the first deputy head of Russia’s presidential administration, plays a central role in directing foreign influence operations.
The investigation identified Alexander Kharychev as responsible for operations against Ukraine and Sofia Zakharova as coordinating work aimed at Western audiences. Practical implementation was attributed to the agency of Russian political strategist Ilya Gambashidze, with the involvement of Nikolai Tupikin and teams of journalists, analysts, designers and social-media specialists. These responsibilities are presented as described by The Insider on the basis of the correspondence; they are not independently verified here.
The reported division of labour helps explain the consistency of the campaigns. Different teams can produce material for separate audiences while preserving the same political message. Stories aimed at Ukraine emphasise corruption, military failure and elite conflict. Stories aimed at partner countries focus on the cost of support, alleged arms diversion and the supposed unreliability of European leaders.
The attacks extend beyond Ukraine. Between January 2025 and February 2026, Storm-1516 spread 34 false claims about France and Germany, according to the available analysis. The claims were repeated in approximately 175,000 posts and received about 274 million views on X. French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz were among the principal targets because of their support for continued military assistance to Kyiv.
Those attacks complement the allegations against Zelensky and the Ukrainian armed forces. The strategy works on two political fronts at once: make Ukraine’s leadership appear corrupt and divided, then pressure its allies to defend every new aid decision against a constantly changing stream of manufactured evidence.
The challenge therefore goes beyond correcting the next fake video or identifying the next imitation news site. Governments and platforms would need to disrupt the operators, financing channels and technical infrastructure that allow the same narrative to reappear under a new logo, in a new language and with a new artificial face.
