Der Spiegel reports that a projected victory for the right-populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Saxony-Anhalt could give Vladimir Putin a new route into German domestic politics – including potential access to confidential security information.
The state parliament election on 6 September could make the AfD the strongest party in Saxony-Anhalt, where it is polling at about 42–43%, well ahead of the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) on roughly 22%. German media, including Der Spiegel, have warned that the party’s entry into the state government could create a serious risk of sensitive information reaching Russia.
The concern centres on the possibility that an AfD politician could become state interior minister. That post would provide access to confidential information held by Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, known as the BfV, the domestic intelligence service responsible for monitoring threats to the democratic order.
Security experts have described the prospect of data leaking to Russia as the “worst-case scenario”. The risk is particularly sensitive because the AfD has a persistent reputation as a pro-Russian political force, while some of its representatives have maintained positions favourable to Moscow. The party’s leading candidate for state premier, Ulrich Siegmund, has already argued in parliament for the removal of sanctions against Russia.
A party under official scrutiny
The danger would not be limited to access to files. If the AfD entered government, its representatives could influence the work of the interior and justice ministries, as well as other agencies responsible for protecting security and the democratic constitutional order.
The AfD’s Saxony-Anhalt branch has officially been designated “unambiguously right-wing extremist” by the local office of the BfV. That creates a stark institutional dilemma: authorities tasked with confronting extremism could come under the political control of a force they themselves classify as extremist.
Such an outcome could damage trust in the state security system and complicate co-ordination between law-enforcement bodies, regional authorities and federal security agencies. It could also make Germany’s partners more cautious about sharing intelligence and other security information if they began to doubt whether it would be properly protected or could reach representatives of Moscow.
From regional election to federal influence
The AfD’s lead in the polls has made its participation in the next state government a realistic prospect. The CDU is far behind, while the Left Party is polling at 11–12%, the Social Democratic party at 7–8% and the Greens on the threshold of entering the parliament at 5–6%.
If the AfD wins, forming a government without it would require difficult negotiations and compromises among parties that are ideological opponents. If it does enter government, the party would, for the first time in Germany’s history, have the opportunity to exercise direct executive power in a federal state rather than operating solely from opposition.
That would give the AfD access not only to ministries and administrative resources, but also to decision-making on internal security and to official contacts with Moscow. Siegmund has also argued for preserving Germany’s access to cheap Russian energy, reflecting the party’s wider demand for a fundamental change in Berlin’s Russia policy.
Participation in the state government could extend the party’s influence beyond Saxony-Anhalt through the Bundesrat, Germany’s upper house, where the federal states help shape national legislation. An AfD presence in that chamber could complicate federal decisions on internal security, sanctions, the budget and other areas requiring the involvement of the Länder, even if the party remained outside the federal government.
A test for Germany’s democratic parties
The possible breakthrough would therefore matter beyond one eastern German state. It could signal to other right-radical and Eurosceptic movements in Germany and across the EU that strong electoral support can be converted into direct control of public institutions.
For the Kremlin, the result could create a convenient channel for promoting a pro-Russian agenda through German political structures, while exploiting divisions within European societies. It could also strengthen calls to ease sanctions on Russia and reduce support for Ukraine, at a moment when European unity is already strategically important.
The immediate unresolved issue is how Germany’s democratic parties would respond to an AfD victory: whether they could construct an alternative government, or whether the pressure to reflect the election result would bring the party into positions carrying responsibility for security, justice and federal co-operation.
Should Germany’s democratic parties exclude the AfD from the state government at any cost, or would that create greater political risks of its own?
