Five EU states sharply increased payments for Russian fossil fuels
EU member states continued significant purchases of Russian oil and gas in October 2025, paying a combined €938 million despite ongoing sanctions. According to a new assessment by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), Hungary, Slovakia, France, Belgium and Romania were the largest importers of Russian fossil fuels that month. The findings, detailed in CREA’s monthly review of Russian fossil fuel exports and sanctions, show that two-thirds of the total October payments were for natural gas, which remains exempt from EU restrictions and is delivered by pipeline or as liquefied natural gas. The remaining share covered oil deliveries to Hungary and Slovakia via the southern branch of the Druzhba pipeline, allowed under a special EU exemption.
Hungary and Slovakia remain the top buyers under existing exemptions
Hungary made the largest payments to Russia in October, totalling €258 million, including €83 million for oil and €175 million for pipeline gas. Slovakia transferred €210 million, of which €162 million was spent on oil and €48 million on gas. CREA notes that while Russia’s monthly fossil fuel export revenues fell by 4 percent to €524 million per day—the lowest level since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine—energy exports remain a critical source of funding for Moscow’s war effort. Revenues generated through oil and gas continue to support weapons production, troop deployments and military logistics.
Mixed sanctions regimes leave key loopholes open
The United States and the European Union have introduced new restrictions in recent months targeting Russian oil and gas. On 22 November, U.S. sanctions against Rosneft, Lukoil and dozens of subsidiaries take effect, accompanied by discussions on extending measures to Russian LNG—a step that would affect new supply routes. The EU’s 19th sanctions package includes curbs on the “shadow fleet” transporting Russian oil and new measures affecting pipeline gas and LNG imports. Brussels has also reaffirmed plans to cease all Russian energy imports by the end of 2027. Yet despite these moves, Moscow continues exporting energy through intermediaries to India, China and other states that retain commercial ties with Russia.
Price caps and stronger enforcement seen as essential
Analysts argue that the decline in Russian fuel revenues—although significant—is insufficient to limit the Kremlin’s capacity to finance the war. Reducing price caps on oil and petroleum products, closing re-export loopholes and tightening enforcement remain critical. Experts warn that EU rules must address LNG imports, which are still formally permitted, and focus on preventing evasion through intermediaries and opaque shipping arrangements. Without coordinated political commitment and strict monitoring, sanctions risk losing their effectiveness.
EU exemptions sustain dependence and weaken collective pressure
Hungary and Slovakia continue importing Russian oil under the EU’s Druzhba pipeline exemption, maintaining energy dependence that complicates the bloc’s unified sanctions stance. Budapest additionally received a one-year deferral from the United States during Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s meeting with President Donald Trump in Washington, temporarily preserving its access to Russian energy. However, experts stress that such reprieves do not resolve long-term vulnerabilities and delay the search for alternative supply routes.
Global market shifts increase pressure on Russian export revenues
A decline in purchases of Russian oil by India and China—historically two of Moscow’s largest buyers—signals growing concern over potential secondary U.S. sanctions. If this trend continues, it could significantly reduce the Kremlin’s export revenues and amplify the impact of Western restrictions. The EU is now discussing its 20th sanctions package, which may include limits on Russian LNG and new measures against the shadow fleet operating outside regulatory oversight.
Targeting the shadow fleet becomes a priority for sanctions reform
Experts argue that any meaningful tightening of sanctions must target the opaque network of shipping companies transporting Russian oil outside formal channels. Proposed steps include sanctions against operators circumventing restrictions, bans on insuring or financing such vessels and enhanced verification of end buyers to prevent re-sales through intermediaries. Without these measures, Western sanctions risk becoming largely symbolic.
